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CHAPTER I
HOW THE WEB WILL BE UNRAVELED
British imperialisml

Some men have spoken these words with

pride; others have spat them out with scornful contempt.

They

have been uttered respectfully by millions for whom these words
embodied an ideal for which they were willing to sacrifice their
very lives.

They have been muttered with deepest hatred by

other millions for whom the phrase has meant defeat, exploitation
exploitation.i
and slavery.

The proper intonation for these two words is what

is sought in these pages.

A sound, objective judgment of Bri-

tish imperialism will be the ultimate goal of this study.
The British empire has been judged time and time again.
Some scholars have roundly condemned it; others have written with
enthusiastic praise of its growth and merits.

A sizeable library

could be filled with books written on this subject.

Yet the

great majority of the comments made on the morality of this subject leave the reader still in doubt as to the extent to which
he should condemn or praise the British for their imperialistic
activities.
From among those who have sat in judgment on the merits of
the British Empire, Lord Rosebery would be a good choice for
spokesman in its defense •. Prime minister of England, 1894-1895,

1

and an enthusiastic promoter of the extension of the empire, he
could speak eloquently in favor of British imperialism, as the
following quotation shows:
How marvelous it all is! Built not by saints and
angels, but with the work of men's hands; cemented
with men's honest blood and with a world of tears,
welded by the best brains of centuries past; not
without the taint and reproach incidental to all
human work, but constructed on the whole with pure
and splendid purpose. Human, and yet not wholly human,
for the most heedless and the most c~~lcal must see
the finger of the Divine. l
Lord Rosebery admitted that not all men cherished the sentiimperialism~
ments he felt toward imperialism.

He conceded that "there are

some to whom the very word is abhorrent; to whom, at any rate,

Is under sU8picion. n2
the word is

If Rosebery had read any of the

comments of historian Parker Thomas Moon on the subject of imperialiSM,
ialISM, he would have seen that Mr. Moon was one of the many for
Whom the word had a less pleasant sound.

imperIalism
For Moon imperialism

has about it the mercenary ring of clinking coins.

He finds it

nothing other than a more dignified
dignIfied name for prof.lte$ring
meroantilism.)
meroantillsm.)
Looking
LookIng further throurp the various
var10us views
v1ews on imperialism
which men have held, we find
t1nd a group of scholars which in large
1Lord
ILord Rosebery, Miscellanies: Literary ~ Historical
262-263_
(London, 1921), II, 262-263.

-

2Ib1d., 232.
2Ibid.,
lParker Thomas Moon, Imperialism
ImperialIsm ~ World PolItics,
Politics, (New
York, 1927), 12.

I

l

3
measure removes the imperialistic activities of the British trom
the moral realm.

To these men the British empire appears to have

grown up in spite of the English rather than beoause they desired
it.

It was the oontention, for example, of Sir John Seeley,

nineteenth oentury political historian, that the British apparently "conquered and peopled half the world in a fit of absence
of mind. ,,4
These and most other evaluations of British imperialism
contain some truth.

However, the picture they present is often

prejudiced and always either essentially incomplete or too
generalized to be very helpful.

Historians have not been inter-

ested enough in the morality of imperialism to spend the time
and effort necessary to determine what it is.

Yet this is the

aspect of imperialism most discussed by the man on the street or
the student in the leoture chair.
It is true enough, a8 Moon as written, that "it is a tangled
web that imperialism weaves."'

To date, scholars have not

fathomed very clearly the way in which the web was woven.

Many,

pulling here and there at the design, have oome to somewhat hasty
conclusions about the motives behind imperialism.

In general,

the bits of truth arrived at have been stretched to answer
questions and to explain actions they oannot adequately answer
4Willlam L. Langer, ~ Diplomacz
(New York, 19$1). 69.

21

Imperialism: 1890-1902,

SMoon, Imperialism ~ World Politlca, 236.

4
or explain.
Most writings on the subjeot remind one of the jingle about
the six blind scholars of Indostan who tried to describe an elephant:
It was six men of Indostan
To learning much inclined
Wao went to see the Elephant
(Though all of thom were blind),
That each by observation
Might satiai'Y his mind. 6

As the verse goes on to tell us, each man took hold of the
elephant at a different place, and

ea~~

conoluded from this

limited experience as to the sort of animal the elephant was.
One felt ita side; he decided that "the elephant is very like a
wall."

Another grasped its tusk, thereby concluding that it was

"very like a spear."

A third took hold of its trunk; he stated

that the elephant wav similar to a snake.

A fourth thought it

"very like a tree" because he had clasped it by the knee.
Another ran his hands over the animal's ear and thought it like
a fan.

The sixth blind man, grabbing its tail, concluded that

the strange animal was "very like a rope."
And so the men of Indostan
Disputed loud and long
Each in his own opinion
Exceeding stIff and strong,
Though eaoh was partly right
And all were in the wrongl 1

6Thomaa P. Neill, Makers of the Modern Mind (Milwaukee,

1949), 2.

1Ibid.

-

-

-

r
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In very similar tasion scholars have studied one or other
aspect of British imperialism and then either given their conelusions as the whole picture, or, at best, given conclusions
which are dissatisfying because of their incompleteness.
This "Indostan" approach to the morality ot imperialism has
also resulted In a wide divergence ot opinion.

Many have taken

a fact or two, wrapped these in surmises, bound in their particular philosophies of life, and put out the whole as a judgment
on BritIsh imperialism.

In the following citation professor

William L. Langer of Harvard University enumerates some of the
difterent analyses of the motivation behind imperialism:
The liberal-bourgeois writers • • • are apt to stress
considerations of prestige, the desire for security,
the striving towards national self-sufficiency, the
tendency towards the organization of ever larger social
unita, or the urge of deeply-rooted ethical sentiments as the impelling motive. underlying the desire
tor expansion. Profe~eor Sohumpeter has advanoed the
ingenious and persuasive argument that imperialism
is really nothing but ataVism, a belated outoropping
of a primitive disposition towards aggression • • •
Another recent stUdent of the problem enda by rejecting
all previous explanations and reduces imperialism to
an expression of the honor motif which i. so potene
a force in the sooial groups as in the individual.
Suffice it to say, then, as professor Langer concludes,
that there as been little agreement among those who have analyzed
imperialism as to the motives which induce a
its territory or oontrol.

8Langer, Diplomacy

£! Imperialism, 68.

co~~try

to expand

6
The only way

til

:sound judgment of British imperialism can be

made is by a thorough, unprejudiced examination of historical
facts.

Just what the British did and why they did it must be
I

determined.

The mtiltiplicity of differing conclusions as to

what motivated Bri11ish imperialist expansion can be explained by
I

the faot thatthis;-.pproaoh has not often been used.
"

As profes-

,,,

sor Langer writes, referring to nineteenth century imperialism,
"almost no attempt, has been made to analyze a concrete example
of imperialist actaon 1n the period."9
this work attempta..

Such an analYSis is what

This method is the basis for hope that this

study will suecee4. in giving a rather adequate explanation of
the motivation beiind British imperialism. 10
I

The method
imperialism.

w~ll

be to study a concrete example of British

The: investigation w11l advance through four stages.

First, a discovert of what the British actually did.
I:Ii

determining who ••• responsible for the actions taken.
an investigation
in this

~f

particula~

Secondly,
~nirdly.

why the British nation acted the way it did
instance.

Fourthly,

til

judgment of just how

were,, the polIcies adopted.
praiseworthy were:
9~., 69 •.

l°Much
l0Much of w~~t is said in these pages will not apply perfectly to the ear~y history of England's imperialiSM 8~nce the
period here stud ~d is the later nineteenth century. '!.he form
of government and.
and political philosophy of ~ngland during the last
century differed: ·in significant aspects from that of England in
the sixteenth, s~venteenth, or even eighteenth centuries.
, ''

-

-

--

---~-

- - -
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It would oertainly be more satisfying to make an exhaustive
analysis of several examples of British imperialist aotivity,
but since this would be impossible in a work of modest size, the
next best approach seems to be to examine thoroughly one instance
of the growth of the British empire.

This method is more advis-

able than a summary investigation of a number of cases of imperialism because thorough oomprehension of what actually happened
is necessary before any solidly founded conolusions can be drawn.
The British imperialistic activities studied in these pages
center around the country of the Sudan, and cover the years

1883-1899.

During this period, one in which modern imperialism

reached its peak, the African country known as the Sudan played
an important role in British politics.

Hardly a day went by

during many of these years in which London papers did not carry
an article about this land.

This prominenoe which the Sudan

enjoyed in the English mind makes it a proper choice as a test
case for a study of the motivation behind British imperialism.
Another reason for selecting the Sudan is that it was made part
of the British empire during the years in which England added to
her rule about three million square miles of African land, great
stretches of border lands along the northern frontiers of India,
balf the Malay peninsula, and several important islands in the
South Pacifio.

An understanding of the motives behind the taking

of the Sudan will serve as a guide to understanding the reasons
behind the other British aoquisitions during thissame period.

8
Moreover, the fact that British poliey regarding the Sudan
changed frequently during the eighties and nineties affords an
unusual opportunity to study the workings of the English imperial
mind.

For these reasons, then, the Sudan has been ohosen as the

territory in which the driving forces behind British imperialism
are to be investigated.
First, the historical facts of the case will be related.
What the English did in the Sudan is the question which will be
answered.

Onoe this has been ascertained, it will be neoessary

to determine what individuals or groups were responsible for the
actions taken.

It would be impossible to determine correctly why

50mething was done unless we first know who did it.

Here the

major problem will be to weigh the importance of the parts played
by certain individuals, by the British parliament as a group, and
by publio opinion in determining British imperial activities.

HaVing shown who was responsible for the imperialist steps
taken, it will then be possible to prooeed to a discovery and
scrutiny of the reasons behind the1r actions.

Here they study

1s limited to two motives which the documents and facts show
were the fundamental motives behind British action 1n the Sudan.
The two motives are the influence of eoonomic cons idera tions and
the urgings of national pride.
Once it has been shown why the British acted the way they
did during the various phases of their fluotuating interest in
the Sudan. 1t will be possible to make a moral evaluation of

\

9
theae aotivities.

Although a judgment of subjective guilt or

lack of it in the individuals involved would be practieally impossible and will not be attempted, some decision as to the
obJeotive merits of British imperialism in the Sudan will be made.
Also the knowledge of the difficulties involved in making a
categorical judgment of the ethic. ot imperialism should result
trom this study.
We are now ready to enter the first phase of our investigation.

In this chapter we have outlined the purpose of this thesia

and the method by which that purpose is to be achieved.

Chapter

II will outline the history of British aot1vity in the Sudan
during the last two decades of the nineteenth century.

CHAPTER II

BRITISH EXITS AND ENTRANCES IN THE SUDAN
Bildad-es-Sudan, the Country of the Blacks, begins just
south of Egypt and extends southwards for about 1200 milss to the
boundaries of Kenya, Uganda, and the Belgian Congo.

Stretching

!'rom 700 to 1000 miles across I'rom east to weat, and lodged
between the Red Sea and Ethiopia on the east and French Equatorial Africa on the west, the Sudan covers an area of 969,600
square miles. l

This is twenty .... six times the area of Indiana and

about one-third the size of the United States.
Lying wholly within the tropics, where according to an Arab
saying "the soil is like fire and the wind like a flame fl2 this
land, even today, is unsuited for habitation by white men.

It 1s

a land of jungles and plains in the south and deserts in the
north.

Great stretches of land along and to the east of the Nile

have now been developed for growing cotton and sugar cane.

In

the nineteenth century it was a savage wilderness almost untouche
IThe ESiptian
ESfPtian Question, 1882-1~21: Sixty ~ Years .~ Bril~),
tish Occupat on of Egypt and the Su an (WashIngton, b.

12.

e,.

- - -

2Moon, Imperialism ~ World Politics,
10

142.
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by axe or plow.

Its only important export was the Negro popula-

tion which the Arabs rounded up in large numbers and sold as
slaves.
The Sudan is populated by two peoples, Arabs and Negroes.
Scholars can only surmise the number ot inhabitants there in the
1880'..

Today approximately 6,250,000 Moslem Arabs roam the

desert regiOns of the north, 2,500,000 pagan Negroes dwell in
the veld and jungles of the south.)

Neither of these two group.

can boast a very high level ot civilization.

The Arabs are some-

what more advanced than the various Negro trIbes, but even the
Arabs are, in large part, an Indolent people, satisfied to live
without houses and with only the minimum of clothing.

Their

wants are rew, and they prefer the tree life of the desert and
the plains to the trappings ot modern civilization.4

Most of the

legro Sudanese are content to live outside of civilization.

They

see little or no reason for wearing clothes: they worship bulls,
crocodiles, and puff adders, they consult witch doctors and rainmakers; they buy their wive ••

>

Geographically the most important and best known feature ot
the Sudan has always been the 11le River which begins in the

.....
3"The ~ettlement in the Sudan Eases the Middle East Crisi8,"
Newsweek (February 23, 1953), 34.

4Prank Richardson Cana, "Anglo-Egyptian Sudan," Encyclopedia
Britannica, 14th ed. (New York, 1929), XXI, 506.
5"Settlement in the Sudan," lewsweek, 36; "Democracy tor
Dinkas," l!!! (December 7, 1952), 35.
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mountains near Lake Victoria to the south of the Sudan and works
its way down the length of this country on its way to Egypt and
the Mediterranean.

~he

river brings water and tillable soil to

the deserts of southern Sudan and to Egypt.

It provided the only

transportation other than the camel tor these two countries in
the nineteenth century, and in large sector. of the Sudan this is
true even at the present time.

Winston Churchill's description

of Egypt as "aut Hilus aut u1hil"6 aptly expresses the importance
of this waterway to both Egypt and the Sudan.
Such was the country conquered 1n 1821 by Mohammed Ali, the
Khedive or governor of Egypt, then a province of the Ottoman
Empire.

This conquest marked the first political union of Egypt

with the Sudan since almost ancient times.

From then until 1881,

when the Sudan revolted against the oppressive Egyptian rule, it
was a breeding ground from which Egyptian slave traders freely
picked their human merchandIse and the Egyptian government enlIsted armies ot strong, brave soldIers.
In 1881, A Sudane.e Arab named Mohammed Ahmed proclaImed
himself the saviour of his country, dubbIng himself the Mahdi or
spiritual leader of his people.

With the help of his fellow

countryman, Abdullah, who became his mIlitary advisor and political strong man, the Mahdi successfully revolted against the badly
organIZed, impoverished Egyptian government.

By the next year,

6winston L. S. Churchill, The River War: An Account of the
Reconguest 2! ~ Sudan (New York, 19.33), T. - -
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when Britain entered the picture, the Mahdi oontrolled the southern half of the Sudan and was threatening to overrun the entire
country.
England's introduct1on to the Sudan oame in 1882 when she
took over the rule of Egypt.

At that time many British govern-

ment officials would have had difficulty finding the Sudan on a
map, but because of its interests in Egypt the British empire was

soon confronted with a serios of problems involving neighboring
Sudan as thorny as the wild hashab tree from which the Sudanese
tap gum arabic.
The boom of guns trom English warships in the harbor of
Alexandria marked the advent of British rule in Egypt.
was July 11, 1882.

1'he date

The chain of events which lead anti-imperi-

alist prime minister Gladstone to take this drastic step began in
181S when the less conservative minded Disraell b.ought 116,000
shares of stock in the Suez canal.

These shares, bought from

bankrupt Egypt, amounted to nine-twentieths of all the stock in
the company.1

From this moment England was forced to become

interested in Egypt.

By paying 4,000,000 pounds sterling for a

passageway through this country to the Red Sea, Britain was dedioated to the policy of protecting her investment.
In 1876 the financial difficulties of the Egyptian government led to the establishment of joint Anglo-French control over

1 John E. Bowen, The Conflict

(New York,

1887), 31.---

2! !!!! !ES!rvest .!B.

ESypt,

Egypt.

This foreign domination of their country chafed Egyptian

nationalists, and in 1881 a native Egyptian colonel, Arabi Pasha,
became the leader of a hybrid nationalist-military movement that
caused many disturbances in the country.

The EnglIsh government,

now headed by "Little Englander" Gladstone, wishing to stay out

ot Egypt, wanted to invite the Turks to restore order in the
country, but this was vetoed by Preycinet, French prime minister.
A joint Anglo-French fleet was sent to Alexandria.

While Britain

and F'rance wrangled over what to do with it, the Egyptian government fell into the hands of Arabi Pasha, who Britain refused to
recognize; riots broke out in Alexandria in June, 1882; the Prenob
ships withdrew.

When shore batteries, which presumably threat-

ened the British navy anchored in the harbor of Alexandria, were
strengthened despite British portest, the British bombarded the
forts on July 11, 1882.

This act occasioned fresh riots, the

burning ot:' the c1 ty, and the land!ng ot Brit1sh forces to restore
order.

A ~rit1sh expeditionary torce commanded by Lord Wolseley

deteated Arabi

Pasha in the battle ot Tel-el-Kebir, September

1), 1862; Cairo was occupied.
The British government, itselt a misxture of imperialists
and anti-imperialists, sanctioned a government in Egypt similarly
divided against itself.

'The Khedive or governor ot Egypt remainea

officially the ruler or the country.

He was allowed to govern

1n all matters 1n which the British had no interest.

To repre-

sent the British a consul-general to Calro was appointed by

1$
England.

Sir Evelyn Baring, later elevated to the peerage as

Earl of Cromer, held this position from 1883 to 1907.

Theoreti-

cally Cromerts position was that of advisor to the Egyptian
De .;;;.f.-a
facto
...
c ...
to... he held supreme authority in the country
--because the British government soon made it clear that his advice
government.

was always to be followed.

A confidential message from Lord

Oranv111e, British foreign secretary, to Cromer, January 4, 1884,
reveals the grip of steel control modestly gloved by the term
"advisor".

Lord Granville wrote:

It 1s essential that in important questions affecting

the administration and safety of Egypt, the advice of
Ber Majesty's Government should be followed, as long
as the provisional occupation continues. Ministers
and Governors must carry out th1s advice or forfeit
their offices. The appointment of English Mlnlsters
would be most objeotionable, but 1t wIll no doubt be
possible to find Egyptians who will execute the ~le
dive'. orders under En§11Sh advice. The Cabinet will
give you full support.
Britain was gradually rorcad to abandon the pretense of her
ad v 1aory pos 1 tion by develop::uents in the Sudan.

The pitiful

Zgyptian army continued, even after British occupation of their
country, to fight the Mahdists.
offensive was begun.
able oondition.

On September 8, 1883, a new

The army Egypt sent to battle was in deplQr

Colonel Stewart, an English professional soldier

hired to train the Egyptians for battle, oomplained that his
offioers were incapable
inoapable of "grasping the meaning of the simplest

8Lord Oromer. Modern EgzPt (New York, 1908), I. 382.
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movement."9

He estimated that one-third of the troops could not

fire a rifle, and that they would be more effective armed with
sticks than with guns.

With such resources Egypt attempted to

repulse the ferocious Sudanese who Tlere fired w:!. th the vis ion of
freedom from Egyptiar.l oppression.

The Egyptians were defeated

in every battle, until finally on November 18, 1883, General

Hicka, English professional soldier and commander-in-chier of the
Egyptian army, was killed anc. his army annihlla. ted..

After this

battle southern and north western Sudan was controlled by the
Sudanese who were threatening to invade Egypt itself.
Prime Minister Gladstone tried to 1.gnore the war.

Having

allowed England to enter. E'gTpt only under protest, he refused to
become fUrt.b.er involved by add:l.ng the Sudhn to his worries •
.flirst of' all, he symp.l.thiaed with the Sudanese who he said were
1Ia.

nation rightly struggling to be free."lO

Moreover, his only

i.ntereet in Egypt; was to save it financially so that other Buropean powers could·not il1terfore in

~ts

government on the score

of settling what was owed them and thus endangering English control of the Suez. l1
Hiding behind the fiction that Egypt was an independent

nation, even though British troops occupied Cairo and Egyptian

lOJohn Morley, ~~e Life of William Ewart Gladstone, 2nd ad.
(New York, 1932), II~-1

11Pau1 Knaplund, Gladstonets .t-'orelgn PollOI (New York, 1935),

•

17
ortlolals held their jobs only so long as they carried out Britain's oommands, the English government refused to deal with the
crisis in the Sudan.

On May

1, 188), Lord Granville stated that

"Her Maj esty's Government are in no way responsible for the operations in the Sudan, which have been undertaken under
ity of the Egyptian government.,,12

~~e

author-

Cromer continued to get

"hands ott" orders trom London until the situation could not
possibly be ignored any longer.

As late as November, 1883, a

telegram trom Granville read, "Her Majesty's Government oan do
nothing which would throw upon them the responsibility ot operations in the Sudan.
own resources."13

The Egyptian Government must rely upon their
However, after November 18 when EngliShman

Hioks and his entire army were massacred, Britain could no longer
remain neutral.

Still with no desire to use English soldiers or

money to subdue the Sudanese, the foreign seoretary instruoted
the British consul in Egypt to advise abandoning the Sudan.14
Suoh advise was not weloomed by the Egyptian governor, but since
the advise was repeated with some insistenoe, the governor had
no other choioe than to resign.

Orders were given to Egyptian

garrIsons and citizens as well as any foreigners residing In the
Sudan to evacuate.
12A. B. Theobald, !h! Mahdiya: ! History
Egyptian Sudan, 1881-1899 (London, 1951),53.

-

l)Ibld., 10.

14~., 69.

2!

~ Anglo-
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Scattered throughout the Sudan were roughly $0,000 Egyptian
soldiers and 5000 civilians who faced possible death or enslavement unless saved from the armies of the Mahdi. l5
a grave problem.

Thia presented

The people to be evacuated were living in small

groups isolated from one another.

Flight would be impeded by the

provisions and possessions they must carry, as well as by the
presence of large numbers of women and children among the refugees.

There were no railways or modern roads.

Water was very

scarce, the country they must travel was desert land.

Even 10

peaoe time the problem would have been one of immense difficulty.
But it was not peace time.

Bostile and victorious armies- barred

the way, and elosely invested the garrison towns.

The whole

country was in rebellion, and the fanatical warriors of the Mahdi
wished nothing better than to oatoh their enemies in the open.
The British government refused to use English troops to aid
evaouation.

Reither would it allow the still poorly organized

Egyptian army to do this work. 16 Gladstone approved a request
to the Ottoman empire for aid, but In the end this government too
refused to send troops.

Disinterested In the Sudan, the British

prime minister, when giving permission to use Turkish troops,
told his foreign secretary, -I oare more that we keep out of the
Sudan than who

g088

10."17

l$Cromer, Modern EgYpt, II, 31.
16Theobald, ~ Mahdila, 70.
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But insistent pleas for help from the Egyptians, the fear of
losing control of Parliament, and the rumblings of British public
sympathy for the people stranded in the Sudan forced Gladstone
to take eome action.

On December 1, 1883, he decided on the

expedient of sending an Englishman to investigate the situation
and possibly to organize the evaouation.

~le

man he chose was

General Charles "Chinese" Gordon.

r<.';f.

Gordon had governed the Sudan for the Egyptians from 1814

to 1819.

He was also a popular hero in England because of his

exploits in suppressing the Taiping rebellion in China, 18621864.

However, when the Egyptian government and Lord Cromer were

asked about sending Gordon, both thought it inadvisable. Cromer
thougnt Gordon too unprediotable for the job. 18 The Egyptian
government, as Lord Cromer wrote to Granville on Deoember 2, 1883,
was "very muoh adverse to employing General Gordon, mainly on
the ground that, the movement in the Soudan being religious, the
appointment of a Christian 1n high command would probably alienate the tribes who remain faithful."19

None the les8 GranVille

oontinued to exert pre8sure on Cromer to approve sending Gordon,
e8peeially after the English newspapers began a campaign for
Gordon as the man to save the Sudan.
Stead, tiery editor of the

~

!!!i

r-·
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On January 8, 1884, W. T.

Gazette and leading stunt
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On the follow~

Journalist of his day,20 had interviewed Gordon.

ing day Stead t s paper ran a front page article headed liChinese
Gordon for the SUdan,"2l

The other papers took up the cry.

Action was demanded of Gladstone's government by the pres8, by
British public opinion aroused by the newspapers, and by a large
section ot Parliament.

¥\eakening in the race of such formidable

opposition, Cromer at last agreed that Gordon might be able to do
the job.

On January 18, Gordon was sent to the Sudan.

Gordon's initial assignment was limited in scope.

Granville

telegraphed to Cromer that "the only object of his mission is to
report on the military situation in the Sudan."22
heartily approved this restricted oommission.

Gladstone

,-

"
When"
the prime

mini.ter read the above telegram he commented, "if he reports
what should be done, he should not be the judge who should do i:i
nor should he oommit us on that point by advice otficially given."
However, in the instructions which Gordon received from Granville
he

Vi

as also authorized to "perform. such other duties as the

Egrptian Government may desire to intrust to you. n 24

This post-

script, aa it were, to Gordon's instructions very soon became
the main body at the commission because the Egyptian Khedive
~aplund, Gladstone's Foreign Poliol, 220.

etTheobald, ~ Mahdl1a,
\ \ ~bid., 77.
~bid.

-

" 24cromer

M
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immediately appointed reporter Gordon as governor-general of the
Sudan "with full powers to take whatever steps he may judge best
for obtaining the end my Government and Her Majesty's Government
have in view.

I could not do more than delegate to Gordon my

own power and make him irresponsible arbiter of the situation.,,25
'rb.eEgyptilin governor also outlined the end he had in view in
appointing Gordon as ruler of the Sudan.

"The object of your

mis s i oli," he w ro te , "is to c arroy in to execu tion the evacua t ion
of those' territories • • • and • • • to take the necessary steps
for establishing an organized Goverlll1lent in the different pro~

the Br!tish governmeut, apparently unwilling to
thwart the Egyptians, and happy to cede the responsibilit1es in
the Sudan to Gordon. acquiesed to this extension of Gordonts
powers.
Losing no time after his commission by the British government on January 18, 1884. Gordon set out for Cairo to report to
Cromer and the Egyptian Khedive.
tor Khartoum, the

c~

He lett Cairo on January 26

ital of the Sudan which is situated at the

confluenoe at the White :NIle and Blue Nile rivers.

February 18

found him at Khartoum.
In keeping with the desires of the Egyptian government and

~.

~he.rles

Gordon,
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his own inclinationa, the new governor-general began immediately
to plan the achievement of hi. two objectives: the evacuation of
the Egyptian garrisons in the Sudan, and the organization of a
native government to replace the rule of the Mahdi.

He had al-

ready decided that the man to rule the Sudan was one Zobehz:
Paaha, a man with commanding influence in the Sudan.
1nf'orma

U8

Churchill

that" on the veI7 day of his arrival at Kb.artoum • • •

General Gordon sat himself down and telegraphed a formal request
to Cairo f'or Zubehr Paaha. n21 His plans for evacuation were alao
quickly made and relayed to Cromer.

Inowing that he would need

outside aid to rescue the people desiring to leave the Sudan,
Gordon requested the assistance ot British and Indian troops.28
The anawers which Gordon received to theae requests were a shock
both to his emotional character and his enthusiasm.

He could

have neither troops nor Zobehr.
Zobehr waa obviously the man for the Job.
Gordon consider him a

Hot only did

".!..!!!!. qua !l..2!l"29 if the Sudan were to have

a satisfactory government, but Cromer also approved himas "the
only possible man;"3 0 the Egyptian Khedive wal strongly in favor
ot him, and Gladstone himself, who law in such an appoIntment a

I

~IbId ••

42.
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~Cromer, Modern Egypt, I, 456.
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way to rid himself of the Sudan was a "strong convert" to the
idea.)l

Yet his appointment was not approved.

The trouble was

that Zobehr was a slave trader, 1n fact the best known and most
successful slave trader in the Sudan.

Granville reported to

Cromer that British "public opinion would not tolerate the appointment of Zobehr Pasha."3 2 Despite the powerful argument put
forth by Gordon that not appointing Zobehr would not eliminate
the slave trade sinoe it would surely flourish under the Mahdi,3)
Parliament refused to sanction the appointment.

Publio feeling

1n England was so opposed to slavery that the members ot the
House of Commons agreed unanimously that "no Government from
either side ot the Rouse could venture to sanction Zobehr."34
Sinoe Zobehr was the only man who could handle the job, one of
the goals for which Gordon had been appointed governor-general
of the Sudan was rendered impossible.
Gordon was equally unsuccessful in evacuating the people
trapped in the Sudan.

An idealist and an emotional man whose

heart went out to every person who mIght be harmed by the Mahdi,
Gordon's concept ot his assignment differed radically from the
viewpoint taken by the more practioal minded Cromer and British

2! Gladstone, III, 1$9.
Cromer, Modern Egypt, I, 486.
~

'. Gordon, Journals.

',1.

~4Morle1' ~ 2!

42.

Gladstone, III, 159.
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officials in England.
bad situation.

Cromer's idea was to make the best of a

As the English agent in Cairo wrote later in his

memoirs, "General Gordon was not sent to Khartoum with ordera
that he was to secure the retreat of every man, woman, and ohild
who wished to leave the Soudan.

He was sent to do the best he

could to oarry out the evacuation."3$

Expressing similar senti-

ments, Lord Granville wrote to Cromer, Maroh
can

8

14, 1884,

"If Gordon

ave the garrisons ot Khartoum, of Berber, and of Dongola

[the last two cities being situated along the Nile between Khartoum and Egypt], it will be in itself a great feat."36

Gordon,

on the other hand, never oonsidered anything short of total
evacuation.

As a result he not only did not save the people in

the outlying districts, but he also tailed to bring out the peopl
in the towns mentioned by GranVille.

This oertainly was a size-

able failure since in Khartoum alone there were between ten and
fiftean thousand persona who wanted to flee to the safety of
Egypt. 37
Presuming that the British were honor bound "to e.xtpicat.
the garrisons whatever it costs,n)8 and that his government would
send the military force necessary to evacuate the entire Sudan,

''':3~omer, Modern Egypt, I, 566.
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Gordon announced on February 27, 1884, that "British troops are
now on their way to Khartoum."39

1'.b.is proclamation, intended aa

a morale booster, actually only turned the people ot Khartoum
against the British and Gordon himselt since it soon became very
evident that not only were troops not proceeding to Khartoum but
that the British had no intention ot ever sending any such assistance.

Gordon's requests for military aid from

~fig1and,

India,

Egypt, and Turkey were all in turn denied by the British governAs early a a May 11, GranVille ordered him to drop the

ment.

idea of evacuating the entire Sudan and "either to report upon,
or, it feaaible, to adopt, at the first proper moment, measures
for his 01l1U'emoval and tor that ot the Egyptiana at Khartoum.. n40
However, Gordon thought he had no honorable choice but "to aee
evacuation through."4 1 He remained at Khartoum trying to win the
support ot various Sudanese oheittains and writing telegrams ,to
Cromer requesting military asaistance.
A campaign in England to "save Gordon" had begun as early

as,March, 1884, both in the press and in the Rouse of Common••
Sending a relief expedition waa repeatedly discussed, but any
such plano matured slowly because cabinet members were deceived
by Gordon's earlier optimistic reporta that he could leave Khartoum anyttme he wiahed, and because Gladatone's attention was

l~Cromer, Modern EgyPt, I, 568.
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taken up

wi~h

other affairs.

As late as August, when Gordon was

no longer ablo even to evacua"te Khartoum because of the encircling
Mahdist armies, it took the threat of resignation made by Secretary of War Hartington and Chancellor Belborne to force the prime
minister to ask Commons for 300,000 pounds to enable the government "to undertqke operations for the relief of General Gordon
should they become necess8,ry.,,4 2 On August 26, a rescue expedition was finally commissioned, and British hopes that popular
hero Gordon would be saved began to soar.
Avidly the Anglish people followed the newspaper reports of
the advance of this army toward Khartoum.

It's progress was

compared with the rapidly increasing danger to Gordon from the
Mahdlst forces beseiging him.
a

pulp magazine thriller.

'lhe utuation had the suspense of

However, the race was won by t..'1.e

Mahdlsts who took Khartoum on January

26, 1885. Gordon was killed

immedIately and his head sent to Mohammed Ahmed.

The British

army was still two hundred miles away.
Horrified at the brutal death of their hero and disgraced
because they had not saved him, the British people raised their
un1ted voices to demand all out war against the

ML~di.

On the

very day that news of the fall of Khartoum reached London, the
Times demanded "upholding the national honour at any cost.,,43

505.
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Such was the onslaught of public opinion that Gladstone's govelttnment was forced to reverse its policy in the Sudan.
vention
war to

bean overwhelmingly condemned; the people demanded a

h~d

b16

Non-inter-

finiah.

With a vote of censure pending 1n Parliament.

Secretary of War liartington telegraphed the command to Lord
Wolselel in the Sudan,

Feb~~ary

9. 1885: "the power of the Mahd1

at Khartoum must be over thrown."44

T.hirteen thousand British

and Indian troops were d1spa tched to the Sudan to

'1 smash the

Mandi" by the government which one year before had refused to
send a Single British soldier to evacuate Egyptian garrisons and
civilians.

A railroad wasbegun from the Red Bea to the Nile to

show the Sudanese and the British people "the fact that we are
in earr.u":uat. and do not mean to leave the country until we have
re ... established order and a. settled government at Khartoum.,,45
The Cabinet realized that only an aggressive offensive in the
Sudan would
tish nation.

satis~J

the wounded pride of Parliament and the Bri-

:Cherefore, throughout February anti March everything

possible wa.s done to effect mat Lord Wolseley called

9.

"counter

poise to the Malldils capture of Khartomn. ,,46
~~e

storm or publio opinion aroused by the fall of Khartoum

and the death of Gordon had begun to die down by the end ot Maroh.

28
Pressure from the

le~t

wing Radicals in Parliament began to swing

Gladstone's government back toward its own less expensive "hands
offn policy in the SUdan.47

'!b. a prime minister, who had approved

the decision to overthrow the Mahdi only because of the overpowerin~

force

o~

public opinion and parliamentary opposition, now

willingly began to look for an excuse for
Sudan.

~le

baok1n~

out of the

opportunity came on April 8th when news reached Londo

that Russian troops had battle with and beaten the Afghans at
the battle of Penjdeh.
inevi table.

An invasion of India by !tussie. seemed

In the panic Th ich resulted in London, interest in
Jumpin~

the Sudan vanished.

at his chance, GladAtone 1mmediately

becanto end hostilities in the SUdan.

On April 13. Lord Hart-

ington wired to Wolseley, "In the condition of imperial affairs
it is probo.ble th9.t the e xped1.tion to Khartoum :may have to be
abandoned, and tho troops brought back as
Egypt. n48

800n

as possible to

Al~ost at once British troops along the Nile began to

retire into Egypt.

Two days later orders were issued from London

to suspend the construction of the railroad. 49
Drltish offensive action in the budan had

. By

Apr!l 21, a11---

~eased; by

May 8, Bri-

tish policy was to limit military activ1ties to defending the

Marriott, England Since Waterloo,
'l'heobald. The Mahdila, 130.

'Cromor, Modern

E~ynt,

II,

25.
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Egyptian border;SO soon even this fighting was left to Egypt,
and the British were out of the war.

British policy, which had

changed overnight 1n February from disinterest in the Sudan to
an all out campaign to conquer it, underwent this second about
face in April.

In February the British government had issued a

proclamation to the people of the Sudan to the effect that they
intended "to destroy the power of the Mahdi at Khartoum."5 l Two
months later the British ceded the Sudan to the enemy_
No further large scale offensives were undertaken in the
Sudan until 1896.

During the intervening years the Mahdist

government retained control of the Sudan except for the land
bordering the Red Sea.

About three-quarters of the Red Sea lit-

toral remained under Egyptian control in 188S.

The remainder of

the coast was wrested from the Sudanese in 1891 when the British
felt the Egyptian army was sufficiently well trained to attempt
an offensive.

On February 19th of that year, two thousand

Egyptian soldiers, wi th British permission and British officers,
defeated a Mahdist army of seven thousand, inflicting 700 death.
while lOSing only ten men. 52
In the same year another step was initiated which presupposed the ultimate inclusion of the Sudan in the British empire.
Preliminary plans were laid for taking Uganda which contains the

~ t~~~'f~.,
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head waters of the Nile.

Lord Salisbury, British prime minister

at the time (August" 1886 - August, 1892), was an imperialist who
"was laready thinking of the ultimate reconquest of the Sudan. n53
He sent out surveyors to determine the feasibility and cost of a
railroad from Mombasea on the coast to Lake Victoria.

However,

little else was done directly by the government to take over
Uganda.

The high cost of war persuaded the English to annex this

country more slowly through the instrumentality of the Imperial
East Africa Company.

In 1894, When the oompany definitely oon-

trolled Uganda, prime minister Rosebery, an even more ardent
imperialist than Salisbury, transferred the government from the
hands of the trade company to the British government.
became a protectorate of the British empire.

The land

England then con-

trolled both extremeties of the Nile, and the imperialist urge
challenged them to take the connecting link.
That this final step would be taken eventually, there was
little doubt.

Lord Cromer writes that if he had been asked he

would have set the date ror reconquering the Sudan at about

1910. 54

In any case it seems certain that he did not on Maroh,

1), 1896, expect to be informed that the British government had
decided on the previous day to invade the Sudan.

Just a rew

weeks before, the Governor-General had given orders to begin the

'(!

~Langer,
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first of a series of projected reservoirs along the Nile in
Egypt, a decision whioh Lord Kitchener, British commander or the
Egyptian army and advocate of war in the Sudan, had taken as a
clear indication that war had defInitely been put orf. 55
not the season for desert wart"are.

It was

The hot summer wi th its ener-

vating heat was just beginning; the Nile was low making travel
in the Sudan very diffiou1t; away from the Nile drinking water
would be non-existent.

At such a time invasion was certainly t"ar

from Cromer's mind, but on that Friday morning a telegram t"rom
London ordered him to send the Egyptian army up the Nile into
the Sudan.
In London the decision had been hatching for over a week.

An oecasion for invasion was at hand.

On March 1, the Italians

had been badly defeated by the Abyssinian. whose land Italy was
trying to invade.

It was stated that unless Egypt attacked the

Sudanese along the Nile, the latter might mass their forces
against the already harraaaed Italian colony of Eritria which
had been extending into the eastern Sudan.

Giving the reason,

therefore, that they had been invited to create a diversion to
relieve the pressure on the Italian army, the British sent Kitchener and his Egyptian army up the Nile as fara. the town of
Dongola, some two hundred miles into the interior of the Sudan.
This decision could not be carried into eft"ect until the end

'¢Churchill,

Rl ver
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of Ap:ril.
tained.

Plans had to be laid, the a rmy gathered, money obAll these matters ware left in the hands of Cromer,

Kichaner, and the Egyptians, since England preferred to treat the
expedition as an Egyptian affai:r which would primarily benefit
Egypt.

The British War Office "only spoke when spoken to and

accepted no responsibility."5 6

The money and men necessa:ry for

the offensive were to come entirely from Egypt.

This was possi-

ble since Lord Kitchener had trained a very competent Egyptian
army and the Egyptian treasury contained a surplus of 2,500,000
pounds. 57

Il'he

only financial complication arose from the fact

that Egypt's treasury was controlled by an international debt
couml1ssion on which Britain, France, Italy, Germany, and Russ 1a
were equally represented.

However, the requested 500,000 pounds

were approved by a 3-2 majority ot the commission, Germany and
Italy voting with Britain.

So the war was on.

With the Egyptian troops supported by Egyptian funds, Lord
Kitehener advanced up the Nile toward Dongola.
vided the only formidable opposition.
the invaders 343 lives.

The elements pro-

A cholera epidemic cost

Contrary winds on the Hile for 40 oon-

seoutive days, and floods unequ.ll~d in 50 years, oaused delay.5 8
~.
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The Mahdist torces, on the other hand, were ineffective against
the well trained EgyptIans.

In a typical battle 1500 Dervishes

retired before only 240 Egyptians. 59

By September 23, Kitchener

had taken Dongola with military oasualites for the whole oampaign
60
amounting only to 169.
Alm~t

a year elapsed after the fall of Dongola before any

further advance up the Nile was made.
1ntended further conquest is clear.

However, that the British
One indication is that soon

after the capture of Dongola, a railroad was begun at the Egypt.
Sudan border whlch was to extend to a polnt on the Nile two hundred miles beyond Dongola.

Kitchener bullt this rallroad so that

he could more easily move troops and supplles into the depths of
the Sudan.

'nbe
'The interlude of inaction was not so muoh a perlod

of indeoision as a time in whlch greater support for the campaign
could be amassed in England.

This was neoessar7 since it had

become evident that the war would require both British troops and
British gold.
Eoonomically, Britain ran into a major problem during this
perlod.

The Egyptian Debt Commission's grant of 500,000 pounds

for the Dongola expedition had been protested by France to an
international court of appeal, on the groun that Egyptian surplus

34
funds were to be devoted only to public works of a per~~nent
character and not to financing a war. 6l On December 2, 1896, the
court ordered the Egyptian government to rofund the money to the
Caisse

~ ~

Detta.

'fhe British government, at the request of

Cromer, repaid the money, a move which defeated Franca but whiCh
also dismayed many close-pursed EngliShmen. 62

This, plus the

prospect of fur·thar expenses (the British subsequently loaned
Egypt 800,000 pouods 63 ) and of using English soldiers in the
Sudan (eight battalions of British infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and a battery of field artillery were sent in 1897 64 ) go far
toward explaining the lapse of time necessary for the British
cabinet to win parliamentary approval for further advance into
th.a

Sudan.
In late SUllL."'1ler,

1897,

the marcil toward Khartoum began.

One

army continued up the Nile while another converged on Khartoum

from the Red Sea, pacifying the eastern Sudan as it came.

By

December, 1897, the Kassala region, east of Khartoum, was in
Egyptian hands.

On September 2, 1898, Khartoum itself was taken

in s. battle in which Kitchener with a torce ot 23.000 men massacred a Sudanese army of 50,000. Thirty thousand of the detendill3

61
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army were killed while the atitackers lost only ,50 men. 65
~~.diately
/I

after his victory at Khartoum,Kitchener pushed

on up the YHle toward a village named
further up the river.

Fas~loda,

over 300 miles

The reason for his haste was that the

French were at temp ting there to pu t sou thern Sudan Ul'lder li'rench
rule.

Eight Fr'enchmen and 120 I1egro soldiers had arrived there

on July 10, 1898, led by the Frenchman, Major Marchand.

They had

reached Fashoda only after a march of over two years, having
started out in February,

1896, just a few weeks before the Bri-

tish ha.d sent Ki tcher. er into the ~h:dan.

Marchand was to have met

at the Nile two larger boOdies of troops coming fI'om Abyssinia.
T:':1.ese reinforcements never arrived, one group because it had no
boats in which to cross the rivers
path, the
tl.'lO

o~her

because of rever. 66

ar~d

swamps that lay in its

Marchand, however, raised

French flag at F'ashoda and declared

Ii.

Flreneh protectorate

over the territory.
After Kitchener'.
Kitchener's arrival. the ft1renoh government saw they
could not hold their position on the Nile without declaring war
on England.

For a time the two countries were olose to

but the French on November

4,

VI

ar, 67

1898. abruptly gave way. announcing

that the Marchand m1ssion would be withdrawn.

Cn December 11,
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the small French force which had reached its destination only
after fighting its way through jungles and swamps a.nd bra.ving
death from fever and savages on a journey comparable in length
to a trip from New York to San Francisco, sadly left Fashoda for
~~ance.

Marchand's departure left the Sudan under Kitchener's

und5.sputed control.

Mopping up operatIons took another year, but

hy that t:!.r:'le t~1e future government of the Sudan had already been

determined.
On ,January 19 J 1899 J Lord Cromer and the EGYPtian foreign
minister signed the Anglo-Ee:yptian Agreement which decreed what
government the Sudan was to have.
upon was called a
"hybrid

fo~m

Egypt.

goverr~ent

decided

which Cro.mer described as a

of government, hitherto unknown to international

jUrisprUdence.,,68
~~d

n condominium,"

The type of

The Sudan was to be ruled jointly

by

,u,ngland

It was a pa.rtnership arrangement, with the important

reservation that England was the senior pa.rtner a..Yld Egypt a poor
second.

Vthen Kitchener took Kharto'U.'!l, he had been instructed to

hoist the Union Jack and the Egyptian flag sida by side. 69
ever, this show of equality was belied by such

0

How-

f'ficial messages

from prime minister Salisbury as the followIng one sent to Cromer
on August 2, 1898: "Her Majesty's

.J)' ~ffcromer,

Gover~~eDt

consider that they

ModeM'! Egypt, II, 115.
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have a predominant voice in all

~atters

oonnected with the Sudan,

and that they expect that any advice which they rJB.Y thInk fit to
tender to the Egyptian Government 1n respect to Suda.n affairs wll
be followed." 70
For all practical purposes, thon, the Sudan became a part
the Bri tish emp1.re in 1899.
February 12,

Its s ta tl1S

1953, when Brt ta in and

by an a~rui)ment

rOMaln~d un~l:1an.~ed

or

until

Egypt ended the condm:l1nhllll

which r;a.ve tho British thr8e years in whicl:1 to

turn the r;overnment over to the Sudanese who were to decide within the same period whether they wanted autonomy or un10n with

Egypt.

As subsequent evonts havo shown, the Sudanese have chosen

independence, and they are now experimenting with democracy in

the manner of a small child vii th a mechanical toy 1 t
tractive

~t

f~nds

a t-

does not know how to operate.

The Sri tish exits and er.trances'in the Sudan mal::e nn iYltricate and intlgulng story.
th~

last two

c ecaCias

In this

cha:~ter

their

lJ.~_3

tory <Juring

of the nineteenth century has teen out11ned,

with some rpferences to indivlduals e.nc

the policies of Gre[·t Brlta1n tn the
Eri tlsh pub 1 tc opinion, of certain

roroup~

Sl~dan.

~_ndt "tdnal

rosponslble for

The

Influene~

of

s t.ates':1€l!1, nne, of

Parliament as a body, were all mentioned in ccmncctton with certa:'.n moves made e1 ther in the direction towal'd or awe.y from

imperialism in the Suda.n.

Chapter III will deal more j1::'6c1s011'
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wi th the problem of where to lay the responslb111.ty for the

aotivities of Britain in the Sudan.

CHAPTER III
PARLIAMENT AND PEOPLE AS POLICY MAKERS
When George Washington's father noticed that a cherry tree
was missing from his front lawn, the first question that popped
into his mind was probably, "Who did it?"

Only when that problem

had been satisfactorily solved would he think of investigating
the reasons behind the deed.

Without a clear answer to the first

question, all thought about the second would habe been mere speculation, necessarily vague and subject to error.

Similarly, in

this study of British imperia11sm common sense demands that we
link up each move toward or away from imperialism in the Sudan
with definite individuals or groups.

It would by no means be

sufficient to remain content with such statements as "the British
extended their empire" or "the British
Sudan."

.~nt

their armies into the

Here the words which must be clarified before any study

'of motivation can intelligently be pursued are "the British."

Do

we mean to hold respona1ble for Britain's actions in the Sudan
certain British pr1me ministers, the British parliament, the British army, the British voters, several of theae groupa, all of
them, or wham?
This question ia not extraordinarily difficult to answer,
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but it does demand the examination of each power group which
could possibly be involved before an adequate answer can be
given.

Because some

au~~ors

have stressed the influence of but

one or other grouP. needless confusion and the errors
to oversimplIfication mark their books.

conse~uent

The writings of other

men give the reader an abundance of useful information about the
cauaes of British imperialism, but regularly omit any distinctions between causes of major import and those which are minor,
between proximate and remote causes, between causes and occasions.
In this chapter the quest is for the persons, groups, and
classes of people who were the really Significant, proximate
_kents responsible for Britain's treatment of the Sudan in the
latenineteenth century.

Study of the a....ailabl. sources make it

possible to reduce these to two poliCY

dete~ining

British government and the British public.

groups, the

Other agents, for

example, the armies of the British empire, the English press, the
Egyptian government, and the various European powera, are also
important, but not precisely a8 primary erficient causes of British imperialism.

Rather they can be ;ermed either inrluences

on the two principle agents, or as instruments by which imperial
policies .ere carried out, as for example the military forces
which actually fought 1n the Sudan.
The really controversial issue which needs clarification
here is the proper degree of importance to be given to the parts
played on the one hand by the British government and on the
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other by the English people.

Britaints act. of imperialism were

due immediately to the decisions of the men who controlled Parliament.

However, since these statesmen were elected, their actions

had to meet with some degree of public approval and would to some
extent be influenoed by the will of the people.

It is neoessary,

therefore, to study the relative importance, and the interaction,
Interaction,
of the government and the governed with regard to the actions
taken in the Sudan.

Such is the problem with which this chapter

is concerned.
im.perialism give
Many aocounts of nineteenth century British imperialism
ImpressIon that Britain deter.mined her foreign policy by
the impression
popular acclaim.

EVen a careful reader may be mislead by the

emphaaia given to the popularity or unpopularity of a Parliamentary decision.

Tne way authors describe the growth of imperial

enthusiasm throughout England tends to the conclusion that the
British government was conduoted not in the House of Commons but
rather in a modern day oounterpart of the Athenian assembly.
The contention here is that it is more important to study
the views on imperialism held by the men who made up the British
Parliament at the ttme than to conoern oneself with the opinions
subjeot of the English publio.
on the same subject

In the really impor-

tant deoisions
deoisioDS regarding British imperial expansion in the Sudan,
historical souroes seem to justify the statement that the
strength of popular opinion was usually overshadowed by the 1ninfluenoe of the men in oontrol of the British government.
fluence

'l'his
This

i

!!
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does not mean that public opinion need not be considered at all,
but just as itlis the officers of an army who determine when the
force is to fight, where the battle is to be staged, and

wheth.~

it is to enter the combat or not, so in a similar fashion it was
the British Parliament much more than the English people that
directed the country's imperial policy.
Great Britain had two major political parties during the
period under oonsideration.

There was the Conservative party

which, despite what its name might imply, was the group more inclined toward initiating imperial ventures.

Opposed to this

party were the Liberals who tended more to cling to the older
idea of tree trade and the independence of small nations.

The

Liberal party was in power fram 1880 to l88S, the period during
which the Sudan was twioe abandoned.

Sudan for the Sudanese was

the policy advocated by the Liberals, a pOSition held despite
strong opposition from Egypt and the British publio.
To ascertain the political platform of the Liberals during
these years is comparatively easy since it was largely the platform of one man, William Ewart Gladstone.

As party leader, Glad.

stone was prime minister during the first five years of the
1880's.

His accession to command in the British government

brought to power a man who had little or no interest in imperial
expansion.

He was interested in trade, not territory.

Colonies

were, in hi. opinion, a needle.s burden and an outmoded method ot
governmellt.

A.an advocate of tree-trade he expected tb,!lt

Ll(;
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empire would gradually disintegrate.

Finding such a prospect

attractive rather than otherwise, he was "willing to aid the process by tho ex.tension of self-Bovernment" to countries 1n the
British empire, as Langer says.l
Gladstone probably would never have anotloned any intervention in Egypt 1f he had not felt compelled to protect the Br1tish
1nvestments 1n the Suez made by his more imperial minded prede.
cessor in the offioe of prime min1ster, Benjamin ~israeli.2

In

September, 1882, the British government assumed control of Egypt,
but from this date until the end of Gladstonets time in office
the main theme of British policy in Egypt was to cast off this
country from the empire as 800n as possible.

Cnruchill write.

that "every act, whether of war or administration • • • [was]
tntended to be final.

Every dispatCh • • • [was] direoted to

breaking the connection between the two countries and winding up

~~e severed atring. H )
All questions regarding the Sudan appeared to Gladstone as
wea.risome interference with his htopes for an earlY' end to British
involvement in Egyptian lovernment affairs.

~hroughout

the en-

suing years Gladstone's government tried to ignore the Sudan
situation

&8

muoh as possible.

In the opinion of these men the

lLanger, Diplomaot 2! Imperialism, 70.
2Bo• en, Conflict .2!

!!!i !!!9. !.!.!! !!! EgYpt, 86.

)ChrUchill, River War, 37-38.
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Sudan wa.s more bother than :tt was worth.

This state of mind is

aptly, though rather sarcastically, caricatured in General Gordon's diary.

Gordon puts into the mouths of the Liberal leaders

such statements as, "That brute of a Mandll • • • [HeJ wl11
destroy all the well earned repose of Her Majesty's Government.- 4
Again in the same vein Gordon has Gladstone's government comment
on the subject of the Egyptian garrisons in the Sudan which Gordon was trying to evacuate. "Those horrid garrisons • • • They
ought to have surrendered at once, troublesome people that they
are, giving so much botherl nS
Fairness to Gladstone demands that it also be added that his
concept of nationalism was that ea.ch nation, small or large, had
a

right to its independence.

The Sudan, he said, was Ita nation

richtly struggling to be free.,t

Gladstone looked on the Mahdist

rebellion as a na.tionalist movement.

He considered Egypt a cruel

and unjust aggressor in the Sudan, and an aggressor, moreover,
whose proprietary claima eould not be backed up by longstanding
or thorough conquest.
"It is no part of the duty incumbent upon us to restore
order

in the Sudan. n6

Such were the sentiments expressed b7

Gladstone on November 2, 1882.

4Gordon, Journals,

Having expressed his mind, hi.

54.

5Ibid., 50-51.
6-

Mo~ley, ~~

Gladstone, III,

146.
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only desire was to forget the Sudan and give himself exclusively
to the business of domestic government.

However, he was not al-

lowed to shake himself tree of the Sudan question so easily.

'l'h.

opposition party In the government, more fervently imperialistic,
and

apparently ready to use the situation in the Sudan as a step-

ping stone to political power, was clamoring for interterence in
the Sudan.

Gladstone could ignore public opinion, but not a vote

of c ensure in Parliament.

This imminent danger to the Liberal

party'. security goes far toward explaining the first of the
token steps Gladstone took in the direction of imlJerla11sm In the
Sudan.
This first step was his approval of sending Gordon to the
Sudan.

His reason was not

80

much to save the Sudanese as it was

to save himself and his party.

In January, 1884, a vote of cen-

sure was pending in Parliament.

The motion was finally presented

on February 12, 1884, but by this date Gordon was already on his
way to Khartoum.

Beoause at this bow to tmperialism, Gladstone

survi ved the censure.
ihe prime

m1ni8te~ hop~d

that the appointment of General

Gordon to the task of investigating conditions in the Sudan would
prove an easy way out of a troublesome situation.

The Liberals

hoped that Gordon too would decide the best that could be done in
the Sudan was the evacuation of Khartoum. 7 Such a deciSion, made

7Marriott. Er£land Since Waterloo, 50).
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not by the L1beral government but by a man chosen by the Conservatives and approved by popular opinion, would have made it possible tor Gladstone to p1geon hole the Sudan problem.

B

When Gordon tailed to oblige the British government by settling for a part1al evacuation of the Sudan, Gladstone was very
upset, but his policy ot nonintervention in the Sudan remained
unchanged.

He was determined that "under no conceivable circum-

stancea" would he "employ a soldier in the Sudan."9

To Glad-

stone's demand that he come out of the Sudan with the garrison at
Khartoum, Gordon responded that he would not because to a bandon
the other garrisons throughout the country would be an act of
nlO
"national dishonour.
Even this attempt to torce Gladstone to
send troops to the Sudan did not Shake the Prime Minister's re.olve to stay out, and when Gordon could no longer leave Khartoum
because the Mahdists had surrounded ht., Gladstone refused to
send in British troops either to r •• cue Gordon or to save the
garrisons and other people trapped in the Sudan.

He had been

forced to make one conce8aion to imperialism when he approved the
sending ot Gordon, he would not be so compromised again if he
could avoid it.

The people, the press, the Queen heraelt, de-

clared that national honor was involved with the fate of General
6Theobald, ~ Mahdiza, 76.
9cromer, ~odern EgYpt, I, 386.
l°Marriott, England Since Waterloo,

504.
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In answer, Gladstone asserted with fiery emphasis in the

Gordon.

Rouse of Commons that the invasion of the Sudan would be a war ot
conquest against a people fighting for freedom.

"Yes, those peo-

ple are struggling to be free," he proclaimed, "and they are
rightly struggling to be free."ll
It appeared for a time that Gladstone had conquered the
appeal for a rescue of Gordon.

a.

had ignored the newspapers and

popular opinion; he had stood up to the oPPosition party in parliament. 12

It was only when members of his own cabinet threat-

ened to resign unless aid were sent to Gordon that Gladstone was
forced to permit further British interference in the Sudan.

To

prevent the resignation of his secretary of war, Lord Hartington,
and of the Lord Chancellor, Lord Selborne, Gladstone at last
approved a small re.cue
reacue expedition consisting of only a slngle
brigade.

But just as his conce.sion to. end Gordon "to report"

on conditions in the Sudan had grown into the appointment ot
Gordon as governor-general of the Budin with power to evacuate
the entire territory and to organize the government of the land,
so now this one brigade quickly became an army of ten thousand
men, selected from the whole army.l)
army.1)

Once Gladstonets decIsIon

was announced to the nation and the attention of all England was
11

Strachey,

~

Victorians, 267.

12 Ibid ., 275.
13Churchill, _Ri~v~e~r
_Ri.....v.....e_r

lI
II

!!t,
!!r., 59-60.

I
'I'll

I

~

III
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centered on it, it was tmpossible to deny the demands of the officers in oharge of the mission.
Still Gladstone was determined that this rescue expedition
should not become a conquering army.

He d.sired that the expedi-

tion take as little time as possible and leave no trace of its
existence behind it.

He would not approve the idea of building

a railroad in the Sudan as part of the rescue plan.

For him such

a notion contained "the most formidable difficulties of a moral
and political kind. lt14 He feared that the "turning of the first
sad"

of s uoh a :railway would be the beginning of Brl t1sh domi-

nation in the Sudan, an eventuality which h. considered completely unjustifiable and wholly undeSirable.
When the expedition failed to save Gordon, a situation aro.e
in England whioh forced Gladstone to make his third, last, and
great.st compromise .. th his anti-imperialist principles.

Here

especially authors assert that it was publio opinion which forced
Gladstone to permit a full scale ofrensive in the Sudan.

A. B.

Theobald asserts that nthe remarkably strong reaction of publio
opinion in England to the l' all of Khartoum and the death of Gordon • • • largely explains the oourse of government policy immediately subsequent to the news."15
would not have daunted Gladstone.

But public opinion alone
It to the voice of the people

l4Knaplund, Gladstone's Foreisa Policy, 238.
15Theobald,

~ Mahdiya, 123.

rr
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had not been added the recurrent danger of a vote of censure,
Gladstone might well have maintained his anti-imperial policy.
It was the wounded pride and political manuevering of Parliament
that Gladstone had to worry about rather than the clamor of public opinion.

Subsequent events show that the intense public

interest in avenging the death of Gordon was of very short duration.

Certainly if Gladstone had had only the British populace

to talk down he could have done

80.

After only three months, and without any real oonquests by
BritaIn, Gladstone was able to call off the offensive in the
Sudan.

On the 28th of February, the government weathered another

VOt0 of censure in Parliament.

In the following month, Gladstone

took the ocoasion of possible danger from the Russians in Afghanistan to begin to pull British troops out of the Sudan.

By April

15, 1885, the government had made public its decision to abandon
most of the Sudan.

Within another month the entire offensive had

been oalled off and all British and Egyptian troops began to retire from the Sudan.
It is interesting to note that such a withdrawal went counte
to the desires of the Queen and of the more fa.natical of the
British public,16 but by this time Gladstone had been able to

convInce Parliament that evaouation waa the wiseat move to make.
Onoe he had made it olear that he was for abandoning the Sudan,

16Knaplund, Gladstone's Foreign PolloZ,

244.
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the opposition feared to push their policy of conquest too hard
lest it end in ruin tor Great Britain, in which case the blame
tor the disaster would be alid to their account.

They could 8ee

the torce of Gladstone'. argument that "While we remain tor war
in the Sudan all the world can bully us, and they have come to

know It.nl7
It should be mentioned here that on the oocasions when the
Conservatives threatened to oust Gladstone's government by votes
of oensure, their hope was that the people would approve their
resistance to the party in power.
foroe to be used to

fur~ler

Public opinion was'for 't:bem ..

their own aims, control of Parliament

and the furtherance of their d eaire for imperial expansion.

On

the other hand, since the Liberals were in control of Parliament
through popular vote, it obviously had public approval to start
with.

It would, therefore, be easier tor the Liberals to retain

the popularity they possessed than for their political opponents
to wrest it from
When

~em.

Gladstone was succ ••ded as prime minister in June, 1885.

by the Oonservative party leader, Lord Salisbury, opposition to
imperialisM was waning in the British government.
remaining

15

During the

years ot the nineteenth century, the Liberals, nevep

completely separated trom their anti.imperial tenets, held the
reins

or

government only tor two briet periods, totalling a little

r
$1
less than three and one half years.

Moreover, even during these

tew years ofpower Gladstone, who still lead his party dur1ng most
of this time, found his following splitting up over the issue of
imperialism.

His most formidable antagonist within the Liberal

party was the outspoken advocate of imperial expansion, Lord Roae
bery, Gladstone t s most important rival for party leaderah1.p and
the man who assumed control of the party 1n

1894.

Rosebery, who as secretary of foreign affairs under Gladstone, forced h!e captian to g'ive up the idea of evacuatlng Egypt
in 1892,

18 openly decried Gladstone's "Little Englander" ways.

In a speech which he delievered on October

25, 1894,

Rosebery

deplored the "party of a small England, of a shrunk England, of a
degraded England, of a neutral Eneland, of a submissive
The fact

tl~t

England!~

Rosebery gained control' of the Liberal party over

Gladstone showed that imperialism was winning out over free-trade
and independence for small nations in Parliament.
Rosebery saw Great Britain's place as the greatest world
power threatened by the imperialism
. of France and. the efficiency
of Germany.20

In

1888 he championed colonialism in a spe~ch in

which he pointed out that "we formerly did not h!lnre in Ollr fol"eign affairs to trouble ourselves with colDnial

qu~gtionB,

because

18Langer. Diplomacy 2! Imperialism, 124.
19!!ti.1., 78.
20

George Malcolm Young, Victorian England: Portrait 2! !a
(Garden City, N.Y., 195~), 246.

we had a monopoly of oolonies.

That monopoly has oeased. tt

21

He

continued to show himself inimioal to Gladstone's platform 1n
1893, when he was atill Gladstone's fore1gn secret&r7, by arguing
tor turther imper1al expans10n 1n an address to the Colonial Inst1tute.

On th1s oocas1on he denied that tbe British emp1re was

large enough to supply the future needs of England.

He stated

that "we are engaged at the present moment, the language ot m1n1ng. t1n pegging out claims tor the future.'

We have to consider
not what we want now, but what we shall want 1n the future. n22
In 1900, Rosebert was st1ll preaoh1ng 1mperialist doctr1ne as h1.
address to the students ot the Un1versity at Glasgow shows.

In

th1s speech, a forthright exposition of nationalism and 1mper1aliSM, he cried out exultantly that "we are a oonquer1ng and imperial race.

Allover the world we have displayed our mettle.

We

have discovered and annexed and governed vast territories. • • •
W. have 1noculated the universe with our institut1ons. tt23 F1nall
in 1909, he is to be found exhorting the delegates of an 1mpel'ial
preas conterenoe to return to the1r homes as "missionaries of Empire--miss1onar1ea of the most extensive and the moat unselfish
Emp1re which 1s known to history."24

In following such a leader

the L1berals were certainly accept1ng ideas diametrically opposed

21Langer, Diplomacy g! Imper1alism,
22~.,

124.

23Ib1d., 78.

77.

r
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to those ot Gladstone.
~~e

Conservative party, which was in power during the entire

period during whiCh the Sudan was finally conquered and incorporated into the British empire, was unitedly imperialistio.

The

man at the head of this party and Who, therefore, was the Conservative prime minister during the three periods 1n which this
party was in power in the last twenty years of the nineteenth
century, was Lord Salisburr.

For Salisburr the reconquest of the

Sudan dominated all questions regarding British policy in

Egypt~4

His interest in Uganda, for whose inclusion in the British empire
he was largely responsible, was motivated by a desire to control
the whole of the Nile River valley.25

Salisbury's concern, like

Gladstone's, was with trade, but he differed from Gladstone in
believing that English economy would be better served by the extenaion at empire and monopoly ot trade within imperial lands
than by tree trade and dissolution of colooie •• 26

In 1895, when

Salisbury became prime minis·ter for the third time he had behind
him a government strongly in favor of imperialism in general and
of reconqueat ot the Sudan in particular.

His position was so

strong that there was little danger of his losing control of the

24Lord Rosebery, Miscellanies: Literary and Historioal
(London, 1921), II, 2.37.
--25
Langer, Dip10macl 2! ImEerlalism 110.
26 Ib1d .,

118.

27 Ibid., 79.

government before he had realized any plans for imperialism he
might have devised. 28

As a matter of fact, he remained prime

minister until 1902, by which time the Sudan issue had been deter
mined deoidedly in favor of imperialism.
By 1890 the British government was definitely inclining
toward the eventual absorption of the Sudan into the British empire.

Less hesitation or reluctance was shown toward using Bri-

tish troops in the Sudan, at least during the periods of Conservative government.

In 1888, a small British foroe was sent to the

Sudanese ooast to drive off Mahdist troops then beseiging the
Egyptian held port.29

These troops were sent despite the faot

that the Egyptians could have handled the situation unassisted, a
way of aoting quite at varianoe with Gladstonets opposition to

,I

sending a single British soldier into the Sudan even when suoh
intervention was the only way in which General Gordon or the tens
of thousands of Egyptians trapped in the Sudan could be saved.
Again in 1889 British troops were sent to help repulse an attempt.
ed Mahdist invasion of Egypt, though here again their presence
,.

1

was not necessary.JO

'.1.

In 1891, Salisbury's government decided to sanotion an

ii
1.1

Egyptian military advance southward along the Red Sea coast into

28

Ohurchill, River

!!£,

99.

290romer, Modern Eglpt, II, 63.

30

-Ibid., 68.

r
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Mahdist held territory.

This sudden reversal of the British

policy of abandonment established by Gladstone indicates clearly
the parts played by government and people In many of Britain's
decisions regarding imperialism.

The offensive was motivated

primarily by the Conservative party·. desire to bring under British control the entire Sudanese Red Sea littoral.

They saw an

opportunity to do so when Uthman Diqna. the Mandist commander in
that sector, was off on a tax collecting expedition accompanied
by

his armw.

Success here would not only put all the financially

important ports of the Sudan in British hands but also would help
to open the way for more extensive oonquest of the Sudan.

A

secondary oonsiderat1.on was the effect this move would have on
publio opinion.

Like any militarT venture, there was the possi-

bility of failure, which, tn this case, might turn the British
people against the Conservative government and occasion its quick
collapse in favor of the Liberal party.

Howev$r, if the Egyptian

armies were Victorious, Salisbury felt confident that the British
would be so delighted by the manifestation of their country's
power that they would give inoreased support to the Conservative
party and not notice at all the change

or

policy so little war-

ranted by condItions 1n the Sudan.)l
The people of Great Britain were not even informed of the
move until 1t was made.

Bor would the invasion have been popular

r

if announced beforehand, since not only was it a military offensive entered into suddenly without any special pretext for war,3 2
but it was also a step to be taken by a still only partially
trained Egyptian army and supported financially by an Egyptian
treasury as yet only cOllvalescent.

The British people, then, did

not suggest or sanotion the offensive beforehand, and afterwards
theywere easily satisfied as to the moral aspects of the move as
long as their armies were in any way victorious.
When the reconquest of the Nile valley began in 1896, again
public opinion was not consulted, nor was the plan inaugurated in
any way by popular acclaim.
solely by Parliament.

Here again the deeision
deoision was mad.

Although the statesmen responsible for

this course of action felt confident they oould arouse public
approval of the plan once it was underway, thi9 was more a condition than a cause of their action.

They were motivated primarily

by a fear that the Frenoh would take over the Sudan unless they
moved quickly.

The government, therefore, made the decision for

the British people, and relegated to a secondary
seoondary position the
problem of what the people would think of their action.
Several facts show clearly that the decision to oommence reoonquest of the Sudan was made independently of, and to some
extentin opposition to, public opinion.

In preparation for the

invasion, prime minister Salisbury went counter to the will of

32~•• 166.
I

,

'II
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the people by pursu tng a conc!.liatory policy towards Russia, a.
s tra tegem w:'1.ose l)UrpOSe

TI as

to wean this cotL.'1try away from Pranoe

so that when the Anglo-French clash in the Sudan would occur, the
French would flnd themselves alone .3.3
troops
too

~_n to

l)lea~ant

\"I::10n the decis ion to send

the Sudal;' was announced, 1 t

CanlC

surprise to the 13ri tish public.

people regarded it as a

some~lat

at firs t a.s a not
In genera.l, the

rash move, especially since it

came at a season of t;-le yca:t" not suited for desert warfare, and

at a time when the British populaoe were very much interested

~

the economic, political, and military progress Egypt ha.d been

makinz, proeress which a war in the Sudan would disrupt. 34
Publio reactton wa.s a factor "'Vhich the gov'crnment had to

consider, bu.t lt was a faotor which they felt confident of controlling, if their armies met with any degree of' success.

The

British cabinet was quite a.pprehensive When, almost before the
campaign was underway, thetr invadi!'..g army, lead by Lord Kl tcr,;.-

ener, came closo to ruin due to floods a:r.;.c. dust storms.
this perlod nm'rspaper
era" to
news • .35

~revent

correspm~dents

During

were "chained to headquart ...

the British people from hearing this disturbing

However, once the army began to move forward .. it took

very little to arouse public enthusiasm.

33Churchill, River

!!!:. 314.

34Atterldge, Toward. Khartoum, 328.
35churehill, River

!!£.

148.

When a small skirmish
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in which the Anglo-Egyptian army suffered only two casual ties waa
presented to the people as a major victory, Englishmen cast aside
most of their resistance to the invasion.

Very soon any carping

criticism was lost in the general approval of their government's
course ot action. 36
At firat, it was announoed that Lord Kitchener would proceed
only as far as the town of Dongola, about 100 miles up the Nile
Into the Sudan.

It was only after this point had been reached

trl&t Kitohener was told to proceed further.

This procedure was

followed, at least partially, with an eye to public approval.

It

was possible to take Dongola almost entirely with Egyptian soldiers and Egyptian money.

Total conquest of the Sudan, on the

other hand, would mean spending British pounds and endangering
British troops, two considerations always unpopular with the
British citizenry, as they are with any people.
In view of possible public disapproval, Salisbury might not
have sanctioned any tmmediate advance beyond Dongola if this
gesture toward invasion had driven the French out of the Sudan.
However, it Is important to note that the Government was responsible for the invasion, and that it was planning eventually to
continue the conquest of the Sudan until the whole country was in
i

British hands.

This is indicated not only by Salisbury'. long

:1

I'
"

standing desire to control the entire Nile river valley, but also

36 Ibid., 155.

-

!'
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by the faot that the prime minister approved the building of a
railroad which extended 200 miles beyond Dongola, at a time when
Dongola was the only definite term of the invasion.

This rail-

road, which was to bridge a huge b,nd in the Nile river, would
have been useless unless Britain took much more territory than
the publioly announoed objective. 37
After Dongola had been taken and it was seen that the French
had no intention of leaving southern Sudan, Parliament resolved
to send their armies at least to Khartoum, the country's capital.
fhis move, the result ot involved diplomatic dealings with the
French. 38 was largely the work of Parliament, which also saw to
it that public enthusiasm tor the move was fostered.

As part ot

this propaganda campaign, General Kitohener was brought baok to
Great Britain to do battle against the anti-imperialists on the
home front and to tire the enthusiasm of the people for the cause
of oonquest. 39
Onoe the Egypt1an and British armies were sent on their way
to Kha'rtoum, there was little doubt that they would continue pa3t
the 01 ty and tal<:e over the entire country.

The French, en-

trenched at Fashoda, deep in the southern end of the Sudan, had
to be driven out.

This was the conviction of British publio

37cromer, Modern Egypt, II,

)8Balevy, Histo£l
39
~leobald, ~

£!

94.

England, V,

Mahdlya, 208.
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i
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opinion as well as of Parliament.

So, with the solid approval ot

his government and fellow citizens, Kitchener advanced in the
manner already described and seoured the whole country for Great
Britain.
Thus it may be said that although the actions of the British
government were clearly conditioned by the pulse of popular opinion, it was Parliament, or in many cases more precisely the British cabinet, which was responsible for the direction of imperial
polioy in the Sudan.
Armed now with a knowledge of Britain's activities in the
Sudan during the late nineteenth century and with some idea ot
who was responsible for these activities, it is at last possible
to attack more directly the motivation behind these activities.
In chapters IV and V the two most important motives will be
treated.

Chapter IV will discuss the influence of economic oon-

siderations on British imperial policy in the Sudan.

\'

CHAPTER IV

A RUN FOR THEIR MONEY
The last two decades of the nineteenth century witnessed the
final lap in the race of the European powers for colonies.

Early

in the race Great Britain had pulled out ahead due to a combination of central!zed, orderly government and offective industrialization.

Moat Englishmen had no fears about the outcome of the

contest until the 1870's.

Then they saw thlt their free trade

policy, which had looked so promia ing in the mid-nineteenth century, was not working out as planned.

The European powers were

not adopting Manchesterism in ita entirety.

As professor Langer

has written, "England had e'1ulpped the other nations to be her
competitors, and now, with the English marl{ets wide open, they
were pouring their products into what ought to be a British preserve."l

On the other hand, Britain found her own exports

unwanted by foreign nHtions.
As the colonial race neared its climax, France, Italy, Russi
and Ger!!lany began to make their bidS, and France and R1JSsia
allied themselves against England in

1894. All these European

powers fought their way to the finish line in a whirl of tarriffs

lLanger, Diplomacy

2! Imperia11sm, 16.
61
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colonial land grabbing, and investments abroad.

Experienced

muddler England, seeIng her lead threatened, battled with all her
experience and mature strength to pull away.

Spurred on by desir

for the victor's honors and purse, Engla.nd pushed ahead and acros
the finish line.

~e

contest was the race for empire; the main

prize, three million square miles of land in Africa; the first
place winner, Englalld.
'fhe manner, time, and location of this colonial race were
determined mainly by the forces of profit and pride.

Saving a

study of the latter motive for the following chapter, we will
here investigate the influence of the pound sterling on British
imperialisM as illustrated by its manifestations in the Sudan.
A series of graphs would show that t.rte 8ri
Sri tish policy in the
Sudan of Ital ternate slaughter and. scuttle lt2 varied, at its most
important stages, in closely paralleling proportion to the rise
and fall of the possibilities for British economic profit.

The

Sudan was abandoned when its conquest would hav,e been costly and
I"elatively unprofitable.

It was taken when the move gave promise

of large econom:i.c ;returns
returns and low overhead cost.
~as

the keynote of British policy in the Sudan.

Self-interest
The decisions

regarding this country were correctly characterized by the statement made in 1883 by a member of the House of COllWlona that: "The

2HUgh E. M. Stutfield, "'fh.• Position of Af.taira
Af.tairs in the
Eastern Sudan." !h.!. l'ortnightly Review, XLIX (April 1891), 386.

first object you [Mr. Gladstone] had when you went to Egypt was
to establish English interests.

It was for the gospel of self-

ishness that you .... nt. it was for the British interests. tt)
In 1883 the British government did not want the Sudan.
take it would have been costly; to keep it, unprofitable.

To
Con-

quest would have been expensive because the fanatical Mahdist
revolutionaries would have to be defeated by British money and
British soldiers. a policy which England avoided whenever possible.

A nation which had won ita empire largely by means of trade

companies or native troops, England was averse to spilling its
own blood or spending its own money to gain territory.

In the

Sudan the questions was, could the country be conquered with
Egyptian resources.
negative.

In 1883 the answer was definitely in the

Egypt's national debt had grown to over 100,000,000

pounds,4 and the Egyptian army could not even defend the parts ot
the Sudan as yet not captured by the Mahdi. S Colonel Stewart, an
able British officer in Egypt, reported that this country "had
not money enough nor fighting men enOUghn6 fo~ the task.
Conquering the Sudan would have saved the lives ot many of
the declared enemies of the Mahdi in this territory, a group of

~

3Charles Chaille-Long, "England in Egypt and the Soudan,"
Borth American ReVie., CLIVIII (March, 1899), 571.

4Ha11,

Empire to Commonwealth, 367.

~ Sudan Question, 35.
6
Morley, ~ 2! Gladstone, III,

5Abbaa,

145.

r
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at least

55,000

people which included Egyptian garrisons and oi-

vilians, toreign businessmen and missionaries, Sudanese who
opposed the revolutionaries.

British military interterence could

have established an orderly, humane government in place ot the
Mahdist reign ot terror.

However, such a policy held no promise

of immediate economic returns tor England.

As a literary publi-

oation of that time stated, "The Sudan was still looked at throug'
financial spectacles, it did not pay its way, and was therefore
worthles8--not worth the life of a British grenadier; it was a
long way otf and might therefore be ignored. n7 Prime Minister
Gladstone wrote in February, 1884, that the British government
had no desire "to inour the very onerous duty of seouring to the
people of the Sudan a just future
tuture government. u8

And, as it

turned out, very little was done even to evaouate the Egyptians
and others in the Sudan who desired safe escort out of the country.

Lord Cromer himself testified that "the withdrawal was for

the most part never eftected at all."9
In 1896
l896 the (.oonomio situation was quite changed.

The Sudan

could then be conquered with very little expenditllre of British
money or men; at that date seizing the country appeared very

7UEngland and Egypt in the Sudan," The QuartePll Review,
---

CLXI (October, 1885), 488.
8
. n
Knaplund,

~ladstonet8

Foteign Poliol, 238.

9Cromer, Modern EgYpt, 11,31.

profitable to England.

80 it was seized.

When Parliament decided on March '12,

1896, that the Sudan

should be invaded, it knew Egypt could do the job without extensive help.

Egypt had the money and_soldiers necessary to defeat

the Mahdista.

Financially Egypt had not only eliminated her

national debt during the years of British occupation, but she had
acoumulated a surplus of 250,000 pounds.

Egypt's battle against

bankruptcy had been won by Lord Cromer in 1888 when financial
equilibrium took the place of an annual deficit in that country!O
Militarily, too, Egypt could stand on its own reet.

By

1899 the

Egyptian soldiers no longer ran away at the tirst hint of battle
with the Mahdi.

Rather they were standing up to and defeating

Sudanese armies which greatly outnumbered them.

In this year the

Egyptian army came ot age at the battle of Toski where 2000
Egyptian soldiers, trained and lead by British officers, deteated
a horde of over 13,000

~udanese.

In this battle, fought along t

Nile some 40 miles inside Egypt, the Mahdlsts lost about 10,000
men whl 1e the .Dgyptian dead and wounded amounte d to on1y
'CI

165. 11

By 1896 Egyptian troops were competent to handle almost any torce
the Sudanese could send against them.
Since Egypt could do the job, the British government decided
that Egypt

~as

the one to do it.

~ince

the invasion was pre-

lOp. M. Sandwith, "Egypt and the Egyptian Sudan," The Cambridge Modern Historz, XII (New York, 1910), 44S.
--- --11

Cromer, Modern EgyPt, II, 70.
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sauted as a move to retake for Egypt a territory which rightfully
belonged to her, England decided tha'c 'Egypt could

tt

justly be

called upon to bear the expensea."12 of the war and to supply the
soldiers neoessary tor the operation.

When Kitohener began his

advance toward Dongola, his army consiated solely of Egyptian
troop..

As Lord Cromer comment.: "A Br1tish battalion was sent

from Cairo to Wadi Halfa [on the Egypt-Sudan border], more as an
indication that in ease of need English help would be forthcoming
than for any other reason.

80me

BrItish officers were temporari-

11' lent to the Egyptian army but beyond this assistance, it was
decided to employ only Egyptian troops in the Nile valley~13 In
matters of finance or logistics the British War Office maintained
the discrete silenoe ot a friendly but disintspested power.

The

war was not only fought by Egypt but it W4& directed a& far as
possible from Egypt.

In a life ot Lord Kitohener we read that

the British home government "only spoke when spoken to and accepted no responsibility.

To Kitchener fell the exeoutive, but in

Cromer was vested absolute control • • •

'1'0

and through the

Agency (in Cairo] passed all demands for men, materials, stores.
and money. and the Agentts (l.e., Cromerta] endorsement was all
that was reqUired to assure th~lr delivery."14

12.!.ill.., 8S.
13
ill.2.., 86.
14Tb.eobald, '!'he MahdiIa, 196 [q~otatlons cited from Sir
aeorge Arthur, Lire-of tord Kitohener, I, 190].

---

Eventually some British funds and fighters were needed when
it was derinltely decided that the whole of the Sudan should be
retaken as soon as possible.

The British contributed 800,000

pounds during the Sudan campaign to supplement

~le

Egyptian ex-

penditure of 1,$54.000 pounds,15 and 8,200 British troops marched
with the 17,600

Egypti~n

soldiers in the advace toward Khartoum:

6

But as Winston Churohill has written, "English history does not
record an instanoe of so great a. national satisfaotion being more
cheaply obtained."17
Satisfied indeed was the Hrltish government with the eoonomic returns from their investment.

It'irst of all, they were able

to add to their empire a very sizeable territory in which British
trade and investments could bring a consolIng profit in the years
to come.

Although the Sudan did not live up completely to the

description 1n

~lackwood's

Edinburgh Magazine which stated that

it was a land one had but to "tickle with a hoe" to make it
"laugh with harvest,n18 yet it was by no means the "useless
eountry H19 General Gordon had olaimed. The ~uda.n provided a fine
15cromer, Modern Ei~Rt, II, 105-106.
16Churchill, R1ver!!!:,

249.

17

Ibid ...

362.

18

"Tb.e Recovery of the Soud.an," Blackwood's Edinbur£,£.l MaGazine, eLII (OctOber, 1892), 875.

19GOrdon, Journals, 117.
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outlet tor British investments, thu8 helping to supply England's
most pressing economic need at that ttme. 20 It also beoame a
fairly lucrative market for British manufaotures as well as a
welcome source of the raVI materials Britain needed.

It became a

ohief source for guml arabic; it exported ivory and hides in sizeable quantities; it was to become the second largest producer of
cotton 1n the British empire. 2l The majority of these exports
were bought by 1i:ngla.nd who in turn supplied at least one-thlrd of
the Sudan's imports.
Secondly, l'Jlgland was a bie to incorporate this backward and
debt ridden country into its empire without worrying about the

Sudan's financial difficulties.

By the ingeniously arranged dual

oontrol of the oou..."1.try, EnglLlld was able to assume the executi va
powers in the country while shunting all the money worries onto
l'''!gypt.

J..'urine; the first docade of condominium rule, Egypt payed

this annual deficit in the Sudanese budget, amounting to a total
of 2,750,000 pounds. 22

By the end of that poriod the Sudan was

solvent.
'I'hj.rdl-;,r, possession of the Sudan supplied a long link in the
coveted chain of British lands stretchlng from Cairo to the Cape
of Good Hope.

A Cape-to-Cairo railroad was often in the minds

2°Langer, Diplomacy 2f. L'T1perialism, 73.
21
Abbas, Sudan Question, 96.
22
Moon, ImperialIsm ~ World Politics,

155.

II,

and on the lips of British imperialists of the late nineteenth
Economically such a railroad would have been a boon to

century.

British trade 1n Africa.

It is interesting to note that Lord

Kltchener seems to have had the Cape.to-Cairo railway in mind
rrom the very beginning of his invasion of the Sudan.

Kitchener

insisted, accord1ng to one of' his biographers, that the guage of
the road bed he laid 1n the Sudan conform to tha.t used 1n South

Africa so that the two sets of tracks might eventually be joined
without difficulty or added expense. 23 llhough this continent
spanning ra:tlroad was still a thine of' the future,

ta.kin~

the

Sudan did have the immed.late commercia.l value of' opening "an un-

interrupted highway • • • for commerce from the Great
the !ted! terranean, throu!'jhout the

~nt1re

.i.takes

to

lenp-th of the valley of

the Nlle. p24
TI1ese

reasons why the British '.vere

SIl t1.s fied

with the econo-

mic value of the Sudan were important, but they were far outweighed

by another consIderatIon, which was that possession of

the Sudan protected the British hold on Egypt, the country which
contained

t~e

Suez carAl.

Historians generally admit that "if

there had been no British India, there would have been no Anglo-

Z3Theobald, The Mahdlya, 210 [the biograPher referred to is
Sir George Arthur;-tife ot lord Kitchener, I, 207].
24stutfield, "Affairs in the Eastern Soudan," FortnightlY
Review, XLIX, 392.

-
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Egyptian question,n2$ or, in other words, that Britain probably
would not have taken the Sudan if she were not interested in protecting her route to India. 26 Obviously, such concern over a
trade route was motivated in great part by economic considerations.

And it is certainly true that the financial worth of

Britain'a eastern empire depended vitally on the Suez canal.

A ••11 rounded rear that Germany, Belgium, or, particularly,
Prance might take over
the 1890·s.

~~e

Sudan worred English atatesmen durIng

This was a serious matter because anyone of these

powera could have ruined Egypt financialll merely by divertIng
the waters of the Nile before they reached Egypt.
Mahdi.~.

As long aa the

had control of the Sudan there was no danger of this for

the Sudane.e were not much interested in international affaira
nor were they sufficiently organized or rich enough to build the
dams and reservoirs neoessary for .uch tactics.

This fact more

than any other explains why England allowed the Sudanese to break
otf from Egypt in 1883 but decided to reattach it to Egypt 1n
1896.

It Prance or any other nation could bankrupt Egypt, the

2$"Bnglish Policy in tile Soudan and Egypt," The British
Quarterly Heview, LXXX (July, 1884), 129.
26Abbas, Sudan Question, 2$; Bowen, Conflict in EglPt
Egypt 198;
Paul Knaplund, ~ BrItIsh Empire: 1815-1939 tNe. YOrk, 1941),
331 & 34$; Langer, Diplomacy of ~erlali8m, 108, William P.
Moneypenny and George E. BUCkle,. tIre of Benihamin Disraeli
(N•• York, 1929), 1313; Frank Riohardson Cana, fi e Anglo.Egyptian
Sudan," Encyclopedia aritannica, XXI (Bew York, 1~29), 511;
Samuel w. Biker, "African DeveIopment: the Sudan, The Fortnightlz
Revi.w, XLVI (Bovember, 1889), $72.
---
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nation controlling the Sudan might easily take over Egypt on the
same pretext England had used, to restore peaee and prosperity to
Egypt.
That there were other nations interested in the Sudan for
the above reason is easy to verity.
interested.

All of the big powers were

Russia was only a remote threat; Italy was near at

hand 1n Eretria, but she was too weak to worry about.

In tact

England had encouraged Italy to expand into Abyssinia and, temporarily, into the Sudan to keep France out of those sectors. 27
In 1888 Germany had made a rather abortive attempt to take the
Lake Victoria region and northern Sudan.

In this year the German

Karl Peters led an expedition into the Sudan ostensively to aid
an Egyptian army which was still battling the Sudanese revolutionaries.

Peters tells us in his books that what Germany actu-

ally wanted Emin Pasha, the Egyptian commander, to do was to
extend his dominion southward to Lake Victoria and German East
Africa.

"The German Emin-Pasha expedition," says Peters, "was no

pleaaure trip, but a large.seale colonial, political
In

expedit10n~~

1890 Belgium sent an expedition from the Congo to the

Bile to claim terr1tory which the

ot 1890 allowed them.

~nglo-Belgian

MacKinnon Treaty

This was something England had permitted

on paper butwhich she had no wish to see materialize.

27.00n, ImperialiSM ~ World Politics, l44.
28Langer, Diplomacf 2! Imperialism, 125.
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Theretore, even betore 1896 England had had her worries
about European interference in the Sudan, but until that date she
had been able to handle the situation by diplomacy, treaties,
assertions that the Sudan was her "sphere of influence."

But

then France began to take serious steps to take over southern
Sudan.

As has been seen, no sooner did Major Marchand start for

the Nile than England launched an attack on the Sudan.

As early

as March 28, 189$, Sir Edward Grey, under-secretary for foreign
affairs, had warned France publicly that "the whole Nile valley
was a British sphere of influence, and that the' advance of any
French expedition, marching under secret orders into this region
would be an tunfriendly act., n29

During the "River War" of

'96-'98 "protection of Egyptian rights" was amphasized more than
the British sphere of influence,30 but whatever the diplomatiC
approach, the fact was that England would not allow France to
take possession of any part of the Nile valley.

One of the major

under17ing reasons for this was the danger involved to the economy

or

Egypt and the subsequent danger to England's hold on the

country.
From what has been said, therefore, it seems evident that
economic considerations were among the most important motives
behind the British imperialistic policy in the Sudan,

It is

29Moon, Imperialism ~ World Polities, 148.

V,

)OHalevy, Hlstorz

59.
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impossible in such matters to weigh exactly the primaoy of motivatIon, but without doubt the factor of finance and the motive
to be treated in Chapter V, national pride, were the two major
influenoes in the history of British imperialism in the ~dan
during the last 20 years of the nineteenth century.

CHAPTER V

PRIDE OF PAUfERS

A~D

PRIME MINISTERS

The profit motive alone will not adequately aocount for the
manifestations of British imperialism in the Sudan..

iinancial

gain will not explain the enthusiasm tor imperIal conquest among
so many nineteenth century Englishmen.

Ordinary citizens do not

lay down their lives or spend their tax money to fight purely
eoonomic wars.

Nor should the members of Parliament who favored

imperialism be accused of acting solely from a motive of economic
expediency.

Reoourse must be had to something more stirring than

a financial report to explain a war fought by a free people.

The

brutality of war must be ennobled by the presence. actual or
artIfiCially injected, of honorable goala.

Some le8s patently

pragmatic philosophy must be sought which would justity the
actions of the British in their own eyes.
Such idealism was infused into the British territorial
aggrandizement known as imperialism by another "i8m" called
nationalism, which phenomenon must be understood if England's
activitIes in the ~dan are to be explained.

Nationalism haa

been described by professor Hans KOhn as a state of mind which
leads men to give their "supreme loyalty" to their nationality.l

74
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Further clarirication of the notion is given by Carlton J. H.
Haye. who speaks of nationalism as a "proud and boasttul habit

or

mind about one's own nation, accompanied by a supercilious or hos
tile attitude toward

oth~r nations.~

It is, he continues, " a

kind ot extended and exaggerated egotism • • • it is patriotiC
snobberz.,,2
Bat1onaliem, then, is first of all a close identification ot
the citizen with his country.

It implies the belief that what-

ever benefits the country benefits the citizen.

Whatever terri-

tories the nation receives are views as personal possessions or
achievements by the nationalist minded citizen.

England's vast

empire, for example, was referred to as "our empire" alike by
British paupers and ministers of government.

The vast areas

colored red on the map of the world caused the breasts of the
propertyless as well as of the wealthy to swell with pride.
Secondly, nationalism engenders the conviotion that onet.
own nationality is superior to all others.
found a strong bulwark in nationalism.

Here too imperialism

Colonie. were viewed a.

"manifestations ot national greatness,"3 or, as Disraell put it
with regard to the British empire, they were a proof of the

~

275.
~

1 Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism: A Studz of Its Origins
Background (~~51', 16.
-20arlton J. H~ Bayes, Essazs on Nationalism (New York, 1941)

--

3David Thompson, En~land !a ~ Nineteenth Century: 1815(Baltimore, 1953), oj.
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"commanding spirit of these islands. u4

Extension of empire could

be leen as a natural consequence of "certain qualities in our
national character. uS
Such a notion further implies a certain divine mandate to
conquer and to rule others.

It justifies imperialism as a task

assigned b7 God, which opinion Kipling expresses in his poem
Recessional when he writes.
God of our father, known ot old,
Lord of our rar~tlung battle-line,
Beneath whose awful Hand we hold 6
Dominion over palm and pine--Tracing the cause ot imperialism back to God in this way
also allowed easy acceptance of the idea that incorporation into
an empire was the greate. of boons for the conquered.

Thus Lord

Curzon could declare that "the British Empire is under Providence
the greatest instrument for good that the world haa seen,"7 and
Kipling could describe the imperialism of his country as a selfsacrificing mission of mercy to the underprivileged.
~ ~hite

His poem,

Man's Burden, epitomized that characterization of im-

perialism, and its popularity shows the extent to which this ide.
was accepted by the British of his da7.
4Langer, Diplomacl 2! Imperialism,
Imperia11sm, 70.
SAltred Milner, England

!a Esypt (London, 1892), 43S.

6

Rudyard Kipling, Collected Verse (New York, 1914·), 219.

7George Curzon, Problems .2! ~!!£ East (London, 1894),ii1.
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The

wlde-sp~ead

acceptance of such notions goes

explaining nineteenth century
at stake but national

p~ide

impe~ialism.

fa~

toward

Money alone was not

as well; and these two ingredients

were so skillfully intermingled that they became components of
the same reality.

It is not too surprising, then that Englishmen

were not only willing to swallow such a mixture but actually
begged tor more.
A fUrther consideration which made imperialism even more
popular as a means to maintain national pride and security was
that few persons of the imperialist nation actually had to sacritice life or limb to a tta1n these gratifying resul ts.

In the

taking ot the Sudan, for example, the vaat majority of the British people were in the stands, not on the playing field.
~

Or, as

Spectator somewhat ecstatically commented: "We may say, indee

• • • as the Scotch laird said of tree-planting.---'They grow
while you're sleeping.' While the public here have been sleepi~
the ever advancing lines have been giving us new provinces and
adding new territories to what Mr. Kipling has toasted as---

'The last and the largest Empire,

The map that 1s half unrolled.,n

8

After the first victories of Kitchener's Egyptian army on
its march toward Dongola 1n 1896, when the British publio began
to shout from the safety of pub or club for further advanoes into
8nour Polioy in the Upper Nile," ~ Seectator, LXXXI
(September, 1898), 329.

18
the heart of the Sudan, a newspaper man who accompanied Kitchener's army wrote, "it was strange to hear the light-hearted way
in which stay-at-home tactitlans arranged the immediate de.truction ot the Khalifa's power. tt9
Whether or not the English would have gone to war so enthuSiastically if it had entailed more danger to themselves it is
difficult to say.

The fact is that throughout the last twenty

years of the nineteenth century the British took aotion again and
again in the Sudan to defend, augment, or vindioate their natlonal pride or prestige.
When Great Britain allowed the Sudan to break away from
Egyptian control, they did not see that their honor was involved.
They could at that time utter such altruistio statementa as that
made in the British Quarterlz Revlew whioh stated, "Our only
intereat in the Soudan is the intereat whioh we feel in liberty
and good government all the world over. RlO
However, the situation waa altered in November, 1883, when
the Mahdists killed an Englishman named Hioks who was in command
of an Egyptian army.

'!bls shedding of English blood, even thougb.

it was the blood of a man hired by a foreign power to fight a
foreign war, was seen as an affront to English honor.

Lytton

9Atteridge, Towards Khartoum, 329.
lO"Engllsh Polioy in the Soudan and Egypt, n
Suarterlz Review, LXXX (August, 1884), 134.

!h!.

British
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Straohey says that fta wave of warlike feeling passed over the
countr,.."ll

"The newspapers," St,raohey writes, "beoante full ot

artioles on the Sudan, of personal desoriptions of the Mahdi, ot
agitated letters from oolonels and clergymen demanding vengeance,
and of serious discussions of future policy in Egypt."12

After

Hiok's death, the Mahdist conquests began to be viewed as an
insult to British pride.

The evacuation of the Sudan became for

many Englishmen a point of national honor.

Bowls of rage and cries ot excitement rang out in England
when the British oitizenry caught the soent of what they oonsidered a national outrage.

Newspapers and people milled around

in searoh of a _y to repair the damage.

--

When the Pall Mall

Gazette put up General Gordon as the man to vindicate their

hono~

public opinion took up the idea with full-throated insistanoe.
When Gordon was finally sent to the Sudan "the nation was delighted. nI ) Here was a man who could save their imperial pride.
Gordon was Just the man to keep the motive or national honor
alive.

His activities at Khartoum were followed avidly by the

British public.

When it became evident that his life was in dan-

gel', the clamor for a rescue expedition was oud enough to drive
eVen anti-imperialist ~ladstone into action.

llLytton,Strachey,
12
Ibid., 248.

~hurchill writes

!l!! Victorians (London, 1942). 262.

IJChurchill, River War,

40.

,
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I

I

that "The Government • • • was driven to the Soudan by the cries
of shame at home. n14 The national disgrace involved if Gordon
were killed was unthinkable.
When the unthinkable happened" nothing short of a full scale.
offensive against the Mabdi would satisty the wounded pride of
the British.

As one authority has put it, the British government

"decided, contrary to all arguments of reasoned prudence, on a
forward policy in the SUdan," because it was "swayed by the tide
of public passion." and was t'conscious of its oWllweakness to
stand against such a cu:-rent. ul5 The British army had failed to
rescue General Gordon.

'r~_

4nerefore, a British force of 13,000 16

must take the field to er'ase what Quoen Victoria called "the
stain lett upon England for • • • [Gordon's] cruel, though heroic
fateZ,,17
Three months of fighting, heavy expenses, numerous casualties, and a Russian threat of invasion in India which caused a
stock market crash in London,18 went far toward banking the fiery
demands for vindIcation of honor.

'l'he British called off the

offensive in tho Sudan, but Churchill tells us that it was done

14rus.., 59.
15Yneobald,

16.!e.!!.,

~ Mahdiya, 125.

127.

17Strachey,

~ Victorians, 293.

18Wi11Iam L. Langer, European Alliances ~ A1l1gn~ent.,
2nd ed. (Bew York, 1950), 313.

,
with eyes averted"in shame and confusion from the valley of the
Hile."

He concludes his dexcription of a disgraced England with

the words, "stopping her ears to the gibes and cat-calls of the
Powers, she turned toward other lands and other matters.~19
Englishmen did not forget their disgrace.

Their pride had

been severely jolted and their military ability seriously questioned in 1884 and 1885 when British armies had failed to save
Gordon trom the Mabdists, and then failed again in their attempt
to a venge their hero's death.

In 1896, therefore, many English-

men .ere still anxious to settle this score.

Although avenging

Gordon was not a direct reason for the decision to reoonquer the
Sudan at precisely that time, it did supply fta strong motive to
the British soldier and wi. a source of satisfaction to the British public."20

A Protestant missionary in the Sudan at the time

referred to this notion of vengeance as the "dominant idea" in
the minds of many Englishmen. 21 Certainly, "avenge Gordon" was
the most popular battle cry of the campaign.
Also rankling in the hearts of the British was the tact

tha~

as Lord Cromer has written, "during a period when British influence was paramount in Egypt, certain provinces, which had before
been open to trade, and which might have been subjected to the
River ~,
War, 89.
19ChurOhill, .Ri_v_e_r

-

20AbbaB, The Sudan Question, 40.
21Robert w. Felkin, "~he Soudan Question," ~ Contemporarz
Revie., LXXIV (September, 1898), 482.
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influence. of civilization, had been allowed to relapse into
barba~i.m.n22

Cromer continues, "National honor was touched."

In 1896 there was a third and most pressing threat to British prestige in the danger of France taking over the Sudan.

On

this point, Samuel W. Baker, one time governor of the Sudan, commented, "It would be a shameful attitude for England to stand by
as a spectator, and .ee a foreign Power march into those territorie. which Egypt won, but which

~gland

deliberately

abandonel~

All England was determined not to let France trample on British
honor in this way.

Winston Churchill says that when Engli.hmen

discovered that Frenchmen were actually occupying Fashoda and
claiming much of the Sudan, fta deep and bitter anger • • • filled
all minds."

Re finds it "pleasing to remember that • • • [this]

great crisis found England united.

Thedetermihation of the

Government was approved by the loyalty of the Opposition, supported by the calm resolve of the peoPle. n24

This general horror

at the thought of England losing out to France in the Sudan
prompted the Chancellor of the Exchequer to declare, "There are
worse evils than war. n25 The Chancellor meant by this that he
oonsidered national honor worth fighting for.
22

Cromer, Modern EgYpt, II,

In this he was

79.

23Samuel W. Baker, "African Development: the Soudan," .........
fh •
Fortnightly Review, XLVI (November, 1889), 571.
24Churohill,
25Theobald,

_R~iv_e_r_~,
R~i~v~e_r
~,

318.

~ Mabdila, 205.
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seconded by the British Parliament and people.
Though much more could be written about the growth of natio&
al fe.lings at all levels of English society toward the close of
the nineteenth century, this brier account gives a suffioient
indication of the influenoe of nationalism on British imperialism
in the Sudan.

The point of this chapter has been made if it is

now clear that nationalism gave the British the moral Justification and emotional conviction they needed to approve and abet
their country's imperial policy.
The aptness of the description of man as an ttacquisitive
animal" is shown in the political sphere by the wars of aggressioo
which accompany the march of men through history with the regularity of footprints.

'rhea8 wars have always been motivated by

the desire for the power and wealth that increase of territory
brings.
n.ce~sary

However, aggressors of the Christian era have found it
to clothe these less than noble instincts in more

respectable raiment.

~he most popular disguise whioh modern

countries have found for the age old policy of aggrandizement
has been nationalism.
l

Throughout the past hundred years national

~

pride has served the British as well a.s the other great Powers of
the world a s the alchemic element whlch can magically change base
imperial desires for power and plunder into a golden, selfless
duty to spread the. advantages of one's own culture to backward
countries, or into an obedient following out of a divinely inspired mandate to rule.
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The investigation of the motivation behind British imperial
activity which has been pursued in the last two chapters complete.
this quest for answers to the questions which vex any man who
wishes to assess imperialism intelligently.

The 801e remaining

talk is to hand down some judgement on the morality of British
imperialism in the Sudan.
ing chapter of this study.

This will be attempted in the conclud-

,
CHAPTER VI
A NEED FOR INJUSTICE

Even

60 years after Britain's invasion of the Sudan, it is

difficult to glveJ. 'l!uch better analysis of the British activities recounted 1n preceding chapters of this study than that
wr1tten about 1820 by Mohammed Al1, then governor of Egypt.

Th1s

Egyptian khedive or governor said, "The great fish swallow the
small, and

E~ypt

1s necessary to England • • • • England must 80me
day take Egypt as her share in the spoil of the Turkish empire. ttl
Since Egypt did not at that time possess the Sudan, he did not
forsee that the British would take not only Egypt but this land
also.
England needed the Sudan to protect her hold on the Suez.
She needed the raw materials and markets of the Sudan; she needed
this link for her projected chain of colonies stretching the
length of Africa.
the Sudan.

Flor these and othe r reasons, England needed

So she took it.

Although one may sympathize with

Great Britain as she fought to maintain her economic superiority
against the powers of Europe, this sympathy should not blind the

Ipelkin, tiThe Soudan Question, tf 483.
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historian to the patent violation of divine law involved in Britain's conquest of the Sudan.
On some mound or mountain appropriately close to the Suez
canal and within the boundaries of Egypt, almighty God gave to
Moses a set of principles in which we find the starting point for
a judgment of British imperialism in the Sudan.

One of these

principles, which has been preserved in the inspired book of
Exodus, is known to men as the seventh commandment.
"Thou shalt not steal. n

It reads,

11118 cOlmns.ndment, which Britain violated

in her dealings with Egypt and
nation of British imperialism.
Sudan, England took it even

~~e

Sudan, is an objective condem-

Because she wanted and needed the

~~ough

it belonged to someone else.

Hidden beneath a maze of' excusing causes and eon.f'used reasoning lies the untenable dootrine of British imperialism which
one writer has expressed in the formula, "laissez prendre."

This

expression of the principle followed by Great Britain in extending her empire into the Sudan was written in 1884 by a clear
sighted Englishman.

~'urth.er

developing this notion as it was

used at that time, this writer oomments, "Nowadays accordingly
the only question seems to be, who is the first taker, as to any
town or country possession of which seem8 likely to prove a.dvantageous.

Our interests demal1d it is the cry of the present

generatlon."2

2H• Ganem. "Europe's Stake in the Soudan," The FortnightlY
Review, XXXV (May, 1864), 654.
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One just1f1cat10n advanced ror Britain's assumption or power

-

10 the Sudan is that this territory was a res nullius and thererore open to the first taker.

This idea is implicit in the 1899

Agreement which asserted that Brita1n's claim to the Sudan relted
on the right of conquest.

The same premise was acted on by Bri-

tain several times in the early 1890's, as, ror example, when she
entered 1nto agreements with Belgium and Italy by which these
countries were allowed to occupy parts of the Sudan. 3
agreements implied that the Sudan, as a

~

These

nullius, could be

d1vided or conquered by Great Britain in any manner she round
convenlent.

They only exemplity the dlplomatlc reason-

All arguments in tavor of the Sudan as a res nullius at this
period are specious.
ing ot the day.

It Britaln upheld the position that the Sudan

belonged to no one, she more frequently took the contradictorr
stand that the Sudan belonged to Egypt.

'lhese conflictlng linea

or argumentation can be unified only by the need Britain relt she
had :for the Sudan.

Convinced of this need, her diplomats and

ministers ot state used any reasons wh1ch would help them attain
their ultimate end.

-

When France attempted to claim southern Sudan as a res
nulllus, and orrered as proof of her claim the Egypt1an proclamation 1ssued in 1884 "restoring the Sudan to its chiefs,,,4 the

108.

'Abbas, Sudan Questlon, 54; Langer, Di~lomacl ~ Imperlalia&
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British replied that this was meant to be only a temporary surrender of Egyptian rights.

But Britaln's most persuasive rebut.

tal was the unanswerable one of military might.

She made it

clear that she intended to take over the entire Sudan unless
France could buttress her appeal to international law with the
more convincing argument of force. S In the end it was superior

or

military strength that settled the fat of the Sudan in favor
Great Britain.

It seems evident that in 1896 the Sudan was an independent
country.

The Mahdlst revolt from Egypt 1n 1883 had certainly

been justlfied.

Egypt, who oould not even rule herself, bad

given the Sudan a government which was economically burdensome
and patently not interested in Sudanese rights or needs.

Al-

though it is true that the absolute dictatorship whiCh supplanted
the Egyptian rule was, in its tyrannical infancy, no improvement,
by the time of the British conquest of the Sudan the Sudanese had
less cause to complain about their government than they had had
for centuries.

Abdullah, who had become the real ruler of the

Sudan, had for several years conducted himself in a manner which
augured well for the future of independent Sudan.
Due to the efforts of this Budanese Khalifa, the development
of agriculture had advanced considerably.

4Theobald,

~ Mahdl1a,

In sharp contrast to

244.

SCromer, Modern ESZ2t, II, 118, Theobald,

~ Mahdila.

246.

the tamines of the first years of Sudanese independence, the
1890's found this country plentifully supplied with grain, and
it. people well fed.

6

With regard to law and order, Father Ohrwalder, a missioner
who was held captive in the

~udan

for ten years, commended the

Khalifa's reorganization of the Mahdi'a chaotic ayatem of justice. 7

It appears that in the suppression of crime Abhullah'.

government ordinarily acted honestly and with the good of the
people at heart.
In the matter of taxation it is true that on occasion the
Khalifa made large and sudden demands on his people.

It is safe

to sa, that when these special levies were added to the regular
tax •• , the people were often more heavily burdened financially
than they had been under Egyptian rule.

However, the less.nlng

of the ordinary taxes, added to the fact that now their money at
least remained in the country, made the Sudanese prefer the
government of the Khalifa to that of £gypt. 8
Even more important is the consideration that even those
Sudaneae who were working for the overthrow of the Khalifa did
not want to hand their country over either to Egypt, their long
standing enemy, or to non-Mohammedan Great Britain.

6

Theobald,

~

Mahdiya, 183.

1Reverend Ohrwalder, fen Years Captivity
--(London, 1892), 214.

8

Theobald,

'~eir

!ht Mahdila,

182.

!a ~

Mahdi'.

f!m2,
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national independence, which Egypt had recognized in the proclamation of 1884, as well as on a later occasion when the Egyptian
High Commissioner

WfiB

sent to the Mahdi to determine the boundaI7

lines between the two coun~ries,9 was something the Sudanese
heartily wished to preserve.
Because England would benefit economically by control of the
SUdrul, and because the Sudanese government dould easily be overthrown, the British refused to consider the possibility of the
Sudan's right to its own government.

Little or no consideration

was given to the subject of possible injustice to the Sudanese
inherent in the British conquest.

On the other hand some lip

service was paid to the Egyptian claims to this country.
sought to placate

the ~gY'ptian

Britain

government as far as s:ae could,

consistent with her determination to maintain the real control ot
the country llerself.

The 1896-1899 campaign, fought for the most

part with Egyptian money and men, was put forth as a venture
a.imed at returning t:;he Sudan to Egypt.

It was, therefore,

necessary to give Egypt some part at least in the government of
the Sudan.

To achieve this end the dondominium form of govern-

ment was decided on by Great Britain.

Lord Cromer explains that

this British invention made the Sudan "Egyptian to suc.h an extent
as to satiJfy equitable and political exigencies. H10
9lbbaa, ~ Sudan Question, 72.
lOCromer, Modern ESypt, II, 115.

1
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However, the Egyptians were not pleased either with the
condominium or even with the conquest of the Sudan itself.

The

Khedive and t.he Egyptian nationalists opposed the British instigated invasion of the Sudan from start to finish.

II

\Vhen the

British informed the Khedive of their decision to retake the
Sudan, he se.w the action as one meant to further Brltlsh rather
than Egyptian interests. Certainly it was not instigated "at
Religiously, the
the request of Egypt n12 as Britain claimed. Religiously.
Moslem

Ef,yptlar~

army, officered and
did not approve of their own army.

supplemented a~ it was by Christians. 1)

Economically, they felt

their country needed further financial stability and such improvements as dams and reservoirs much more than it needed the
Sudan at that tlme. 14
Egyptian opposition to the decision to reconquer the Sudan
was slif)lt in comparison to their chagrin and helpless anger at
the form of government Great Britain forced them to accept for
the Sudan.
signed the

Botrus Ghall Pasha, the Ep,yptlan foreign minister who

1899 Agreement,

was assassinated.

The Agreement

Itselr was seen as a diplomatic trick by which Britain got the

11Abbas, Sudan guest1on, 72.
12Moon , Imperialism ~ World Politics, 150.

llAbbas, Sudan Buesti2a,

57.

Riv6r
War, 100.
l4churchi11, _R.-i
...
v6.;;.;r... !!.!:.
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'Ji~'ith some justification the

Sudan and Egypt got the bills. 15

Egypt1ans felt that they might not have been accepted as co-ruler
of the Sudan if that country had not been a financial liability.

Actually, Egypt had little part in the

goverr~ent

of the Sudan.

The highest offices held by Egypt1ans in the Sudanese condomin1um
government were those of mamurs, in reality
tant district commissioners.
It must

ue

a8sista~t8

to assis-

16

admitted that British control of the Sudan did in

many ways benefit both Egypt and the Sudan.

Egypt had no longer

to worry that a foreign power might interfere with the waters ot
the Nile.

Also she was spared the difficulties of ruling the

Sudan at a time when she required Bl"itish assis tance to govern
even her own territory.

As for the Sudan, 'the British provided

the country with the best government it had ever known.

As one

modern scholar has written: "The Sudan has been very fortunate
in attracting high quality British imperial admi.nistrators of a

kind which inspired the epigrllm of tha late H. A. L. Fisher: 'The
Sudan. gentlemen, Is a large oountry populated by blaoks and
governed by blues. ,tt17 The slave trade was abolished; agriculture
was encouraged on a grand scale; taxes were appreciably lowered;
the natives were to some

ex~ent

educated and prepared for even-

15Abbas, Sudan Suestlon, 52.

16

~.,

51.

17Andrew Roth, "Dl1e:nm;e. in the Sudan." 'I'heNatlon, CLXXIV
(May

24, 1952), 499.

---
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tual selt-government.
Nevertheless, unless the prinoiple is admitted that the end
justities the means, this episode of British imperialism must
stand condemned.

Either the Sudan was an independent country or

it belonged to Egypt.

In either ease, the British conquest was

an act ot aggression flowing out of a series of similar acts by
which Great Britain had unjustly maintained control of Egypt
itself.

It was an injustice which England thought necessary to

maintain her position

a8

a world power; it was an injustice ap-

proved by British nationalisM; it was an injustice which brought
definite benefits to both Egypt and the Sudan.
injustice.

But it was an

,

l
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